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An emerging consensus among election law scholars urges courts to break out 
of “the stagnant discourse of individual rights and competing state interests” and 
instead adopt a jurisprudence of “structural” democratic values that sidelines 
individual rights. This structuralist approach won out in the great “rights-
structure” debate in election law, and came to dominate the field, during a period 
in which the main controversies—vote dilution, gerrymandering, ballot access, 
campaign finance—were all ones in which the structuralist move was illuminating. 
However, structuralism is now causing both scholars and courts to evaluate the 
new wave of vote denial controversies, over such issues as voter identification laws 
and voter roll purges, in problematic ways that bypass the importance of each 
individual voter’s right to cast a ballot. 
This Article breaks out of the rights-structure debate by offering a distinctive, 
pluralistic account of the interests at stake in all voting controversies. Some of 
these interests are indeed structural, in the sense that they are interests of the polity 
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as a whole; some are the interests of groups; and others are irreducibly individual 
in nature. This pluralistic account explains why structuralism was the right 
approach to certain election law questions and yet is leading both scholars and 
courts to misjudge the new vote denial cases. This Article argues, through both 
political theory and American voting rights law, that the individual right to cast a 
ballot matters for reasons that are independent of election outcomes and structural 
concerns. By allowing individuals to vote, the polity includes them within the circle 
of full and equal citizens. This Article excavates this individual interest in equal 
citizenship, demonstrates its centrality to the foundations of our modern voting 
rights regime, and explores how taking it seriously would reshape both the 
scholarship and the jurisprudence of election law, especially in the domain of “the 
new vote denial.” 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, when the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board,1 the case upholding Indiana’s law requiring voters to show photo 
identification, the reaction among election law scholars was swift and negative.2 
The problem was not necessarily the result. It was that the doctrinal framework the 
Court deployed—balancing an individual right to vote against the state’s interest in 
preventing fraud and “safeguarding voter confidence”3—seemed to miss what was 
really at stake in the case.4 This dissatisfaction with Crawford reflected a much 
larger trend in election law scholarship. An emerging consensus in the field holds 
that courts make a mistake when they rely on the doctrinal framework the Court 
employed in Crawford: balancing an individual right (the right to vote) against a 
“structural” interest of the state (here, preventing fraud and “safeguarding voter 
confidence”). Instead, this emerging consensus holds that courts ought to focus on 
“structural” benefits and harms—benefits and harms that affect the structure of our 
whole democracy—on both sides of the ledger. As Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes 
argued in their important article Politics as Markets, the Court must break out of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 2. See, e.g., Airtalk with Larry Mantle (Apr. 28, 2008), 
http://www.fluctu8.com/podcast-episode/airtalk-for-monday-april-28-2008-hour-2-4320-
25805.html (interviewing guest Richard Hasen, who argued that the “most troubling” aspect 
of the decision is that its reasoning ignores whether legislators enacted the law in order to 
skew the electorate in a partisan fashion); Edward B. Foley, Crawford and the Amicus Court: 
Further Support for a Non-Partisan Advisory Tribunal, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Apr. 29, 
2008), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/articles.php?ID=413 (decrying the 
“doctrinal weakness” of Crawford); Daniel P. Tokaji, Crawford: It Could Have Been Worse, 
ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Apr. 29, 2008), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/ 
2008/04/crawford-it-could-have-been-worse.html (explaining his “most serious 
disagreement” with the decision: its “focus on the individual voter misses the likely systemic 
impact of the law”). 
 3. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197. 
 4. See, e.g., supra note 2. 
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“the stagnant discourse of individual rights and competing state interests” if it is to 
address the main issues at stake in election law controversies.5 
Issacharoff and Pildes’s critique captivated academics, and inspired the 
“structural turn” in election law scholarship, for good reason. The critique had 
considerable force. The Court’s basic doctrinal approach to election controversies, 
with its focus on individual rights and competing state interests, was arguably well 
suited to the early, so-called “first-generation” voting rights claims: claims 
attacking barriers that prevented blacks from voting.6 But the Court applied this 
same rights-based doctrinal approach to “second-generation” controversies far 
beyond this initial domain—from quantitative and racial vote dilution to the 
“expressive harm” of racial gerrymandering7—and also to controversies in areas 
such as campaign finance and party rights. Many of these controversies involved 
interests on the plaintiff’s side that were essentially either group based or structural: 
it was at least awkward, and perhaps impossible, to disaggregate the interests at 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of 
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 717 (1998). The authors argued that “courts 
avoid confronting fundamental questions about the essential political structures of 
governance and instead apply sterile balancing tests weighing individual rights of political 
participation against countervailing state interests in orderly and stable processes.” Id. at 
645. This article built on previous work by both authors and also by Pam Karlan. See Guy-
Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1113–30 (2005) 
(explaining the trajectory of “structuralist” scholarship and the rights-structure debate); see 
also Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 630 
(2002) (calling for an approach that “moves away from the notion of individual rights as the 
prime protector of the integrity of the political process, and looks instead to the structural 
vitality of politics”); Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term; Foreword: The 
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 40 (2004) (arguing that 
while “[c]onstitutional lawyers are trained to think in terms of rights and equality . . . politics 
involves, at its core, material questions concerning the organization of power”); id. at 59 
(“[F]amiliar and conventional models of individual rights . . . will provide no solace in 
addressing structural problems concerning the proper allocation of political representation.”). 
  Issacharoff and Pildes themselves have not yet taken a position on the question of 
how to apply structuralism to the new vote denial. But adherents of the structuralist 
approach, such as Spencer Overton, Chris Elmendorf, and Jim Gardner, have now done so. 
See infra notes 13–19 and accompanying text. 
 6. But see Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 5, at 652–68 (discussing the White Primary 
Cases and arguing that their critique extends back even to first-generation claims). 
 7. Racial vote dilution claims form the core of what scholars have come to call the 
“second generation” of voting rights claims. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the 
Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1671 (2001); Lani Guinier, The 
Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1093–94 (1991). Second-generation claims look beyond questions of 
participation to questions of aggregation. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
  There is also, conceptually, a “third generation” of voting rights claims that concern 
questions of governance. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on 
African Americans: Second- and Third-Generation Issues, in VOTING RIGHTS AND 
REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 121, 125 (Mark E. Rush ed., 1998). However, the 
actual trajectory of voting controversies seems to be backward toward the “new vote denial” 
rather than forward into this third generation. 
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stake into coherent burdens on particular individuals’ rights. Thus, the structuralist 
scholars’ critique repeatedly hit its mark. The individual-rights-versus-state-
interests doctrinal framework plainly was not capturing the real interests at stake on 
both sides of these cases. Structuralist scholars urged the Court to reorient its 
jurisprudence toward promoting the interests of the whole polity, framed in terms 
of democratic values: competitiveness, participation, “democratic contestation,” the 
disruption of “lockups,” and other indicia of a healthy democratic order.8 These 
scholars’ side of the great “rights-structure” debate in election law scholarship now 
“has come to dominate the field.”9 
The aim of this Article is not to rehearse the case for the opposite, “rights” side 
of that debate. This Article does not endorse the broad view of scholars such as 
Richard Hasen, who argues more or less categorically, on the basis of a considered 
distrust of the Court’s ability “to make contested value judgments in political 
cases,” that the Court should eschew structural democratic considerations.10 The 
project here is different. Rather than claiming that one broad doctrinal 
framework—rights or structure—works best across the entire landscape of election 
law, this Article articulates and defends a more pluralistic and contextual approach. 
Specifically, this Article defends the proposition that while the Court’s individual-
rights-versus-state-interests doctrinal framework was the wrong approach to certain 
kinds of cases, it was the right approach to Crawford and will remain the right 
approach to the rapidly expanding area of litigation now known as “the new vote 
denial.” 
Crawford was the Court’s first encounter with a fast-growing storm of highly 
politicized controversies in election administration in which efforts to prevent fraud 
clash with efforts to protect voters from disenfranchisement. Future flashpoints will 
likely include registration list purges, partisan challengers inside the polls, the 
treatment of voters attempting to vote at the wrong location, provisional ballot 
rules, early voting rules, absentee ballot rules, residency rules (particularly in 
relation to college student voters), and/or the processes and venues for registering 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. For an argument for participation, see Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: 
Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 85 (2004). For 
“democratic contestation,” see Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 
YALE L.J. 734 (2008). For the disruption of “lockups,” see Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 
5. Some versions of structuralism focus not on effects or outcomes but on the state’s reasons 
for acting; in either case, the structuralist approach contrasts with a rights-based approach 
focused on harms to individual plaintiffs. E.g., Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The 
Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 729 (1994) 
(“[O]nce the structural conception of rights is adopted, the focus is not on the quantum of 
individualized harm involved, but rather on the qualitative justifications for the state’s 
exercise of authority.”). 
 9. See Charles, supra note 5, at 1119. Charles’s article provides an excellent overview 
of how structuralism became the dominant approach. 
 10. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY 
FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 139, 154 (2003); cf. Chad Flanders, How to Think 
About Voter Fraud (And Why), 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 93, 150 n.138 (2007) (siding with the 
“individualist” rather than the “structuralist” analysis of voter fraud controversies but 
concluding, “it is solely in the case of voter fraud that I find the individualist analysis most 
persuasive”). 
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voters. Dan Tokaji has termed these controversies “the new vote denial”11 because, 
unlike many other current election law questions that concern issues of 
representation and the aggregation of votes, these hark back to a different, older set 
of battles over which individuals should be allowed to cast ballots at all. 
The rapid proliferation of these new vote denial controversies has reshaped the 
landscape of election law that gave rise to the structuralist critique.12 As the 
structuralists correctly charged, the individual-rights-versus-state-interests doctrinal 
framework developed in first-generation voting rights cases offered the wrong 
toolkit for adjudicating many second-generation controversies. But unlike those 
second-generation controversies, the new vote denial controversies implicate the 
individual right to cast a ballot and have it counted. Thus, the doctrinal claim of the 
Article is this: just as the individual rights-based doctrine developed in first-
generation controversies was the wrong set of tools for adjudicating many second-
generation controversies, a purely structural approach of the kind scholars have 
now developed in response to second-generation controversies is the wrong set of 
tools for adjudicating the new vote denial. The problem is conceptual: the 
individual right to vote matters for reasons that are not entirely reducible to the 
structural interests of the polity as a whole. Each individual voter also has an 
independent interest in her status as a full, equal citizen. Those who advocate 
approaches to the new vote denial controversies that sideline this individual interest 
in favor of broader, structural concerns are encouraging the Court to repeat the 
mistake it made in the second-generation cases—in reverse. 
In recent years both structuralist scholars and anti-fraud activists have pointedly 
urged the Court to make exactly this mistake by recasting the harm of 
disenfranchisement in wholly structural terms. Some versions of this approach 
frame the harm of disenfranchisement in terms of a decline in the overall level of 
participation or turnout.13 For the structuralist scholars, a central argument is that 
disenfranchising citizens has the effect of lowering the rate of participation, a key 
structural variable important to the health of a democracy. For example, Chris 
Elmendorf suggests that in order to decide how closely to scrutinize an election 
regulation, courts could “ask whether the requirements cause the number or 
distribution of participating voters to deteriorate by more than a given amount 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the 
Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 701–18 (2006). 
 12. As recently as 2004, a structuralist scholar could write that “at least in mature 
democracies, cases concerning democratic processes today do not often implicate what 
might be considered intrinsic political liberties (leaving aside in the American context, 
perhaps, the few remaining access-to-the-ballot-box issues, such as voter-registration or 
felon-disenfranchisement laws).” Pildes, supra note 5, at 52. Today, the exception consigned 
to that parenthetical—“access-to-the-ballot-box issues”—is swallowing a substantial part of 
the rule. An increasingly large and hotly-contested subset of all election law controversies 
are vote denial controversies. See Tokaji, supra note 11, at 709–18. 
 13. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation: New 
Pressures for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 675–
77 (2008); Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 634, 657–58 
(2007). 
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(x%).”14 Anti-fraud activists essentially concur with this conceptual framework but 
add some questionable empirical claims: they argue that while a bit of 
disenfranchisement does indeed reduce participation, anti-fraud measures so 
increase “confidence” in the electoral process that more people vote, and net 
turnout actually rises.15 Either way, the key is overall participation, not individual 
rights; disenfranchisement matters because, and to the extent that, participation 
drops. Similarly, Spencer Overton and others argue that voter identification laws 
should be rejected on the basis of what amounts to a cost-benefit calculus weighing 
the number of fraudulent votes prevented against the number of legitimate votes 
deterred.16 This argument has become sufficiently commonplace that some election 
law scholars now simply assume that some version of it is the correct framework 
for resolving the new vote denial controversies.17 Yet another version of the all-
structural approach uses as its yardstick the ultimate representativeness of elected 
officials, which might also be negatively affected by sufficiently widespread 
disenfranchisement (or fraud).18 What all these proposals have in common is that 
they direct our attention away from questions of individual right and toward 
structural features of the democracy as a whole.19 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. Elmendorf, supra note 13, at 675. This argument may be an application of the 
general proposition that courts’ focus, in their review of “electoral mechanics,” ought to be 
on the structural question of “whether something is seriously amiss with the democratic 
process.” Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: 
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 325 (2007). 
 15. As one congressional advocate of a recent anti-fraud bill put it: “Despite all the 
claims that disenfranchisement would ensue” after the enactment of Arizona’s law requiring 
voters to show identification and prove their citizenship, “testimony in Phoenix revealed that 
registration went up 15 percent . . . . The fact is, people are encouraged to vote when they 
believe their vote will count and know that their vote will not be canceled out by an illegal 
vote.” 152 CONG. REC. 18,738 (2006) (statement of Rep. Ehlers). However, available 
empirical evidence does not support the proposition that anti-fraud measures increase 
turnout. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 16. Overton, supra note 13, at 635 (“If further study confirms that photo-identification 
requirements would deter over 6700 legitimate votes for every single fraudulent vote 
prevented, a photo-identification requirement would increase the likelihood of erroneous 
election outcomes.”). For a discussion of “erroneous election outcomes,” see infra notes 
109–10 and accompanying text. 
 17. See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts & Matthew D. Neumann, Documenting 
Disenfranchisement: Voter Identification During Indiana’s 2008 General Election, 25 J.L. & 
POL. 329, 330 (2009) (“At its most foundational level, the debate surrounding photo 
identification requirements can be resolved by balancing a photo identification requirement’s 
ability to preserve the integrity of elections by preventing in-person voter fraud against the 
extent to which such a law limits access to democracy by preventing legitimate voters from 
casting countable ballots.”); id. at 330 n.6 (clarifying that this essentially means balancing 
“the number of legitimate voters excluded” against “the number of illegitimate voters 
prevented from casting fraudulent ballots”). 
 18. See Elmendorf, supra note 13, at 675–77. 
 19. See generally James A. Gardner, The Dignity of Voters—A Dissent, 64 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 435, 462–63 (2010) (arguing that “a robust individually held right” is not “the proper 
vehicle for vindicating the relevant constitutional values” and arguing instead for “[e]ither a 
purely structural approach” or an approach in which individual rights claims are “treat[ed]” 
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Part of the appeal of these proposals is that they seem to allow courts to compare 
like with like: instead of weighing an individual right against a structural interest, 
these proposals would have courts use structural criteria to evaluate both sides. 
Some conservative activists and politicians have recently also proposed the 
opposite approach: using rights to evaluate both sides in the new vote denial 
controversies. These advocates have advanced the novel claim that fraudulent votes 
“disenfranchise” legitimate voters—and therefore, that blocking a few legitimate 
voters from casting ballots may be an acceptable price to pay to combat the greater 
disenfranchisement purportedly caused by fraud.20 This approach, too, holds out the 
promise of a doctrine that compares like with like. 
Courts have mostly resisted both of these moves, although each of these ideas is 
beginning to make inroads in court opinions, including those of the Supreme 
Court.21 Most of the time, courts stubbornly refuse either to recast the structural 
problem of fraudulent votes as a violation of individual voters’ rights or to recast 
the individual right to vote as an instrument for achieving structural values such as 
overall participation or representativeness. 
This Article offers an explanation for, and a defense of, courts’ resistance to 
these innovations. The basic argument, which Part I develops, is that there are 
multiple, irreducibly distinct interests at stake in voting controversies. Some of 
these interests are individual in nature, others are group interests, and still others 
are structural in that they are interests of the polity as a whole. Conflating these 
interests can lead to problems. When we recast an interest as something it is not, we 
often erase part or all of why we valued it in the first place. In particular, each of 
the conceptual moves courts are (so far) mostly resisting—recasting certain forms 
of fraud as disenfranchisement, or recasting disenfranchisement as a purely 
structural rather than an individual-rights problem—would have the effect of 
bypassing or erasing part of what is valuable about the individual right to 
participate. 
Thus, Part II offers a defense—specific to the new vote denial cases—of the 
Court’s much-criticized doctrinal framework balancing the individual right to vote 
against competing structural state interests. The Court developed this framework in 
a series of cases beginning with the ballot access case Anderson v. Celebrezze22 and 
refined it in Crawford. The argument of Part II is not that this still-developing 
                                                                                                                 
as “structural and instrumental”). Gardner’s argument is not specifically addressed to the 
new vote denial controversies, but covers all controversies that arise at “the end-stage of the 
election process,” which includes most of the new vote denial. Id. at 462. 
 20. See infra Part II.A.2. Richard Hasen has also endorsed a version of the view that 
rights are on “both sides” of at least some vote denial controversies. See Richard L. Hasen, 
You Don’t Have to Be a Structuralist to Hate the Supreme Court’s Dignitary Harm Election 
Law Cases, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 465, 466 (2010) (“In Bush and the voter-identification 
cases, the Court failed to recognize rights on both sides of the case and that the rights of 
voters on (what turned out to be) the losing side easily trumped rights on the winning side of 
the case.” (emphasis in original)).  
 21. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 22. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). Anderson built on precedents including Storer v. Brown, 415 
U.S. 724 (1974), but those prior cases did not develop the flexible balancing approach that 
makes Anderson notable. See also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992) 
(applying Anderson). 
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Anderson/Crawford doctrinal approach is perfect, but that it has great potential and 
is significantly better than the competing options that are being urged on the Court 
from all sides. In different ways, each of the competing alternatives fails to account 
for a central part of why the individual right to vote matters. 
The first two Parts of this Article rest on a premise: that the individual right to 
vote matters, in significant part, for reasons that are not reducible to structural 
values. That is, the analytic argument in Part I and the doctrinal argument in Part II 
both rest on an idea that the individual right to vote is valuable for reasons that 
cannot be fully captured by broader, structural variables such as the overall level of 
participation, representativeness, democratic accountability, and so on. 
Part III takes some initial steps toward the broader project of developing an 
account of why the individual right to vote matters—and therefore, why vote denial 
matters—for reasons that are individualistic rather than structural. This argument 
fills a surprising gap in the existing election law literature. Although we commonly 
refer to the right to vote as an individual right or a fundamental right, surprisingly 
little work has been done in election law scholarship to develop a robust normative 
or interpretive account of the harm(s) involved in vote denial. The first-generation 
cases simply did not require any such account; the wrongness of black 
disenfranchisement was sufficiently overdetermined that the early cases did not 
require scholars to develop a theory of vote denial. But today this theoretical gap is 
becoming more noticeable as the new vote denial controversies escalate. 
Part III argues that the right to vote matters because by allowing individuals to 
vote, the polity includes them in the circle of full and equal citizens. The harm of 
disenfranchisement thus cannot be reduced to its impact on election outcomes—
even though it is possible that disenfranchising enough people could swing the 
results of an election, and even though that possibility may be what motivates the 
partisans on both sides of the new vote denial controversies. The 
disenfranchisement of any one person is also a dignitary harm to her in particular. 
This individual dignitary harm is distinct from the expressive aspect of voting, 
which is similarly independent of outcomes.23 This dignitary harm is intertwined 
with an equality claim, as Part III explores.24 The dignitary harm may be especially 
acute when the individual who is disenfranchised is someone whom society does 
not always treat as a full and equal citizen in other contexts, such as a citizen who 
is disabled, homeless, or poor. That is, the dignitary harm may be especially acute 
when, and because, it is part of some broader pattern of unequal, second-class 
treatment.25  
This equal citizenship dimension of the right to vote is entirely invisible if we 
imagine that “voters are little more than worker bees in a complex, collective 
enterprise the only point of which is to register . . . decisions made by the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 331 (1993). 
 24. This link between dignity and equal citizenship is at the heart of my disagreement 
with Gardner, who argues against recognizing “the dignity of voters.” See Gardner, supra 
note 19, at 441; see also infra notes 202–12 and accompanying text. 
 25. Such broader patterns sometimes can be stated in terms of the treatment of groups. 
For example, the harm of disenfranchisement may be more acute because it is part of a 
broader pattern of racial group subordination. However, these broader patterns need not fall 
along group lines. See infra Parts III.E & III.G.  
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collectivity.”26 It is not captured by any analysis of election outcomes. But it is at 
the core of why the right to vote matters—especially for individuals who are not 
always treated as full, equal citizens in other areas of political and social life. 
The account this Article offers of why the individual right to vote matters is 
necessarily preliminary and incomplete. But it should be sufficient to justify 
making a clear distinction between the individual right to vote and structural 
concerns such as turnout and representativeness. This Article suggests that we must 
be careful to avoid arguments that subtly recharacterize the individual right to vote 
as a mere means to some other, different end, such as a high level of participation. 
And it provides a useful normative foundation for an important task courts will not 
be able to avoid in the years ahead: developing standards for weighing the 
competing interests at stake in the new vote denial controversies. 
I. ELECTION LAW PLURALISM 
This Part defends what we might call “election law pluralism”: the proposition 
that there are multiple, irreducibly distinct interests at stake in voting controversies, 
only some of which are best framed as instances of the “right to vote.”27 Pluralism 
is inevitably unsatisfying in some respects. It would be easier to decide certain 
controversial questions if one fundamental interest or value were all that mattered: 
the polity’s interest in disrupting lockups,28 for example, or the interests of racial 
and political groups in achieving fair representation, or the interest of individual 
voters in casting their ballots and having them count. But the interests at stake in 
voting controversies are not so simple. When we pretend that all the relevant 
interests have the same shape, we are pressing square pegs into round holes; they fit 
only if we carve away part of what made them distinct, and valuable, in the first 
place. 
In a 1993 article, Pam Karlan usefully distinguished three domains of interests at 
stake in voting controversies: participation, aggregation, and governance.29 These 
domains are, roughly, temporal stages. First, voters vote; then the votes are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. Gardner, supra note 19, at 462 (emphasis added) (endorsing this view). 
 27. This proposition is closely related to Guy-Uriel Charles’s view that multiple 
principles—such as “majority rule, political participation, accountability, responsiveness, 
substantial equality, and interest representation”—are at stake in controversies over 
democratic politics. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic 
Politics: Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 
1142 (2002). Rick Pildes has similarly suggested that the right to vote “protect[s] several 
different core interests” that are “qualitatively distinct.” Richard H. Pildes, Response, What 
Kind of Right Is “The Right to Vote”?, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 45, 45 (2007); see also 
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Neimi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting 
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
483, 499–506 (1993) (reading Shaw as a case defending value pluralism against 
gerrymanders that reflect “value reductionism” by treating racial representation as the only 
value at stake). I thank Chad Flanders for suggesting the descriptive label “election law 
pluralism” for the proposition I defend here. 
 28. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 5. 
 29. Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. 
L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1993). 
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aggregated in some way to determine outcomes; and finally, those who were 
elected govern. We all have interests at each stage. 
The participation domain includes the individual right to cast a ballot and have it 
counted. As Part III will discuss, this amounts to a right to be included as a full 
citizen of the polity. The participation domain also includes the polity’s interest in a 
high overall level of turnout. What participation interests have in common is that 
they are independent of election outcomes. They are independent of questions of 
how votes are aggregated—except on the limited but important point that a given 
vote is aggregated, rather than being left in a dusty box somewhere, erased from a 
memory card, or otherwise improperly excluded from the count (whether 
accidentally or through deliberate, fraudulent acts by election officials).  
Aggregation interests, by contrast, are “essentially outcome-regarding.”30 The 
archetypal aggregation interest is probably the one found in a clause of section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act (VRA), added in the 1982 Amendments, which holds that 
members of a protected group (a group defined by race, color, or language minority 
status) cannot “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate . . . to 
elect representatives of their choice.”31 This simple formulation has wide 
applicability beyond the VRA. As a general matter “each voter has an interest in 
the adoption of aggregation rules that enable her to elect the candidate of her 
choice.”32 Defined this way, aggregation interests are at the heart of one-person-
one-vote claims, racial vote dilution claims, and numerous other claims regarding 
the district lines, processes, and rules by which votes are translated into outcomes. 
In aggregation claims our right to cast a ballot is not at issue. Rather, our interests 
generally turn on who is in the set of other voters or groups of voters with whom 
our votes are aggregated, as well as the rules governing that aggregation. 
Voters also have interests in governance: in what elected officials actually do 
once in office. Each of us has an interest in the enactment of policies we favor. 
Making policy, at least in a legislative setting, involves legislators other than one’s 
own representative. Thus, a concern for policy outcomes will generally entail a 
concern for the “overall composition of the governing body.”33 I have an interest in 
the virtual representation I may receive because legislators who do not represent 
my district nonetheless share my political party, my policy views, my race, or some 
other politically salient characteristic that leads them to govern in ways I prefer.34 
The Court recognized a governance interest of this kind in Georgia v. Ashcroft35 
when it held that there was no retrogression of minority voters’ interests under 
section 5 of the VRA where the losses to minority voters’ aggregation interests 
(i.e., electing candidates of their choice) were offset by gains in terms of “putting in 
office people that are going to be responsive.”36 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. Id. at 1713. 
 31. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006)). 
 32. Karlan, supra note 29, at 1712–13 (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. at 1717. 
 34. See id. 
 35. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
 36. Id. at 489 (quoting testimony of Congressman John Lewis). The dissenters in 
Ashcroft would have held that the section 5 retrogression inquiry should be concerned 
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A. Interests and Interest Bearers in Voting Controversies: A Conceptual Scheme 
The domains of participation, aggregation, and governance do not specify 
anything about the interest bearers. Three different kinds of interest bearers—
individuals, groups, and the polity as a whole—each have interests in each 
domain.37 Thus, nine conceptually distinct combinations of interests and interest 
bearers are potentially at stake in voting controversies. We might visualize them 
this way: 
 
                                                                                                                 
exclusively with aggregation interests: the question should simply be the opportunity of 
members of the minority group to elect candidates of their choice (including through 
coalition districts). See id. at 492–93 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 37. I use “groups” here broadly: the groups with interests at stake in election law 
controversies include groups defined by geography, political party, and race, as well as 
groups defined by any other variable that is sufficiently politically relevant that members of 
the group share some political interests in common. 
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Table 1: Interests and Interest Bearers in Voting Controversies 
      Interest 
      Bearer: 
Interest:  
A. Individual B. Group C. Polity 
1. Participation 
• My interest in 
having the right 
to cast a ballot 
and have it 
counted 
• Our interest in 
our members 
having the right to 
cast ballots and 
have them counted 
 
• Our interest in 
our group’s rate of 
participation 
• The polity’s interest in its 
members having the right 
to cast ballots and have 
them counted 
 
• The polity’s interest in 
promoting a high overall 
level of participation 
2. Aggregation 
• My interest in 
aggregation 
rules that allow 




• My interest in 
aggregation 




• Our interest in 
aggregation rules 
that allow us to 
elect our candi-
dates of choice 
 
• Our interest in 
aggregation rules 
that give our votes 
influence over the 
outcome 
• The polity’s interest in 
impartial and fair 
aggregation rules 
 
• The polity’s interest in 
making sure that election 
outcomes are not altered 
by fraud 
 
• The polity’s interest in 
values such as competition 
or stability that depend on 
aggregation rules 
3. Governance 




from my district 
or not) 
 
• My interest in 
having policies I 
favor enacted 
 










from our district(s) 
or not) 
 
• Our interest in 
having the policies 
we favor enacted 
• The polity’s interest in 
having good public 
policies, and/or its 
preferred public policies, 
enacted 
 
• The polity’s interests in 
the processes of policy 




Delineating these three interest bearers in addition to Karlan’s three domains 
helps clarify what is distinct about interests that might otherwise seem the same. 
On the “participation” row, an individual’s interest in participation is entirely 
concerned with her individual right to cast a ballot and have it counted. Having this 
right enacts a form of civic inclusion that does not depend on whether a voter 
actually exercises the right.38 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. See infra Part III. A freedom not to vote is sometimes taken to be an important right 
of citizenship, but that idea is contested and beyond the scope of this Article. 
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For groups and for the polity as a whole, however, more than one type of 
participation interest is in play. Groups and the polity as a whole have interests in 
protecting the rights of their members and affirming their inclusion.39 In addition, 
groups and the polity as a whole have interests in the aggregate level of 
participation or turnout (either within the group or overall). 
A polity might value a high overall level of participation for its own sake, or on 
the grounds that high levels of participation are instrumentally useful for promoting 
other democratic values such as civic engagement, accountability, or 
representativeness. A strong tradition within democratic theory emphasizes broad 
participation as a foundation of a healthy democratic order.40 Bruce Ackerman 
argues that, in comparison to most other civic activities that are more time intensive 
and costly, “voting is the paradigmatic form of universal citizenship participation”; 
thus, a high level of participation in the form of voting is a necessary component of 
a robust democracy.41 Similarly, a group might value a high level of participation 
among its members, either because it values its members’ political engagement or 
for the instrumental reason that if its members vote, the group will have greater 
political clout. 
B. Distinguishing the Interests of Individuals, Groups, and the Polity 
Before moving further it is worth pausing to clarify why it makes sense to speak 
of individuals, groups, and the polity as having distinct interests even though 
individuals make up groups and the polity as a whole. Distinguishing these interests 
can help us clarify which ones are doing the real work in a given controversy—and 
ultimately, which ones ought to anchor courts’ analysis. 
The polity’s interests are conceptually distinct from the interests of individuals 
and groups. Benefits (and harms) to the interests of the polity are public goods (and 
bads). They are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable. There is no way for me to live in a 
stable or competitive or noncorrupt polity without my neighbor also doing so. 
Individual and group interests, in contrast, do not work this way. Some individuals 
and groups may enjoy the right to vote while others do not. Some can aggregate 
their votes together to elect their candidates of choice while others cannot. Some 
will see their preferred policies enacted while others will not. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. These interests are parallel to an individual voter’s interest in her own right to vote; 
we might think of them as many individual voters’ interests added together.  
 40. While this tradition generally does not limit participation to voting, voting is central. 
For the classic normative political theory argument, see CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION 
AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970). See generally STEPHEN MACEDO, YVETTE ALEX-
ASSENSOH, JEFFREY M. BERRY, MICHAEL BRINTNALL, DAVID E. CAMPBELL, LUIS RICARDO 
FRAGA, ARCHON FUNG, WILLIAM A. GALSTON, CHRISTOPHER F. KARPOWITZ, MARGARET 
LEVI, MEIRA LEVINSON, KEENA LIPSITZ, RICHARD G. NIEMI, ROBERT D. PUTNAM, WENDY M. 
RAHN, ROB REICH, ROBERT R. RODGERS, TODD SWANSTROM & KATHERINE CRAMER WALSH, 
DEMOCRACY AT RISK: HOW POLITICAL CHOICES UNDERMINE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND 
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2005). 
 41. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 239 (1991) (emphasis in 
original). This point naturally raises the question of compulsory voting, which is a subject 
for another article. 
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Just because some interests are group interests does not mean that the law must 
recognize “group rights.”42 Our law often takes careful account of the interests of 
individuals, groups, and the polity as a whole without conferring rights or standing 
on all the corresponding interest bearers. As Heather Gerken has pointed out, many 
claims of the type she calls “aggregate rights” involve legal claims by individuals, 
yet “fairness is measured in group terms.”43 When an individual plaintiff brings a 
claim of vote dilution, the right to an undiluted vote “rises and falls with the 
treatment of the group” and “is unindividuated among members of the group” in 
that “no group member is more or less injured than any other group member.”44 
Indeed, there is no way to evaluate whether the claim should succeed or fail 
without reference to the overall interests of the group.45 Though the law may confer 
standing on individuals, it is the group’s interests that the law sees. 
This phenomenon—the law’s unambiguous recognition of certain group 
interests, even where the plaintiffs are individuals rather than groups—is not 
unique to election law. An employment discrimination plaintiff with a disparate 
impact claim under Title VII makes a case of exactly the same shape: she argues 
that a particular employment practice has a disparate impact on her group’s 
opportunities and, for that reason, violates her individual rights.46 What the law is 
doing here is accounting for where the real interests lie—even where that entails 
acknowledging that the real interest bearer is not the same as the party with legal 
rights and, indeed, may be the sort of interest bearer (e.g., a racial group) that could 
not itself be a rights bearer or appear in an American courtroom.47 
To determine whether the real interest bearer is an individual, a group, or the 
polity as a whole, the basic question we need to answer is straightforward. If the 
benefit or burden rises and falls with the group, affecting all group members 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. For a discussion of how individual rights may protect group interests, and vice 
versa, see Robert C. Post, Democratic Constitutionalism and Cultural Heterogeneity, 25 
AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 185, 191–95 (2000). 
 43. Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1663, 1681 (2001). 
 44. Id. 
 45. To see why, consider a simple example: Under conditions of racially polarized 
voting, one minority voter lives in a majority-minority district and another lives in the nearly 
all-white district nearby. Suppose the first voter can always elect her candidate of choice and 
the second voter never can. Their individual aggregation interests have no relevance to a 
racial vote dilution claim. Either both of the voters, or neither, experienced vote dilution; the 
answer turns on the aggregation interests of the group.  
 46. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–54 (1982) (explaining that Title 
VII protects “the individual employee, rather than . . . the minority group as a whole,” yet the 
disparate impact inquiry turns entirely on whether the employment practice has a disparate 
impact on the group). 
 47. Indeed, in vote dilution claims, some members of the relevant group may not even 
have the right to vote. In one-person-one-vote claims, children are “persons,” as are 
noncitizens. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (requiring Congressional reapportionment on 
the basis of the “whole number of persons in each State”); Garza v. Cnty. of L.A., 918 F.2d 
763, 775 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming the use of persons, rather than citizens, in redistricting as 
well). The groups most relevant in election law cases, such as racial groups, often include 
both citizens and noncitizens. 
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equally, then we are in the group column; if the benefit or burden rises and falls 
with the whole polity, affecting all members of the polity equally, then we are in 
the polity column. This framework allows us to see some of the underlying richness 
of what might otherwise seem the most pedestrian of election law claims: the one-
person-one-vote cases. 
Justice Frankfurter famously held in Colegrove v. Green that malapportionment 
was an injury to the interests of the polity as a whole, rather than to the interests of 
any one individual or group.48 Unlike contemporary structuralist scholars who view 
the democratic interests of the polity as a whole as a proper—or the proper—object 
of judicial protection in election law cases, Justice Frankfurter held that 
malapportionment was a polity-level harm in the context of his broader argument 
that “[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket.”49 But Justice Frankfurter was 
wrong about the interests at stake in malapportionment, and the Court ultimately 
recognized this and overturned Colegrove.50 The main harm of malapportionment 
is not an injury to the whole polity—it is an injury to group aggregation interests. 
Malapportionment creates obvious winners and losers along various group axes: 
geography, political preferences, and even race.51 The Court recognized this.52 
Malapportionment may also have been a public bad, but framing the harm 
exclusively in polity terms (as Justice Frankfurter did) simply did not adequately 
account for the interests at stake. 
While the normative force of malapportionment claims comes from group 
aggregation interests, the legal force of these claims seems to come from a different 
place: a close but imperfect analogy to individual disenfranchisement. The Court 
built a right against numerical vote dilution on the foundation of the individual 
right to cast a ballot.53 This close analogy hardened into doctrine when the Court 
held in Reynolds v. Sims that “the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement 
or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly 
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”54  
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (“This is not an action to recover for damage because of 
the discriminatory exclusion of a plaintiff from rights enjoyed by other citizens. The basis 
for the suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity.”). 
 49. Id. at 556. 
 50. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding, contrary to Colegrove, that 
malapportionment is “within the reach of judicial protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1964).  
 51. The racial disparities created by malapportionment seem to have been important to 
Earl Warren. See Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 
80 N.C. L. REV. 1269, 1296 (2002). 
 52. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) (noting the “end result” of 
Georgia’s malapportionment: it “weights the rural vote more heavily than the urban vote”); 
see also Charles, supra note 5, at 1129–30. 
 53. See Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 570 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to vote and the right to have one’s vote counted”—the 
individual participation interest—“clearly imply the policy that state election systems, no 
matter what their form, should be designed to give approximately equal weight to each vote 
cast”—the individual aggregation interest). 
 54. 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). In other early one-person-one-vote cases the Court made 
similar moves. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
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This move was a little too quick. While “debasement or dilution” indeed 
undermines a voter’s ability to affect election outcomes, outcomes are not the only 
reason the right to vote is valuable. The Court goes too far in Sims in claiming that 
“[t]o the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a 
citizen.”55 The analogy between denial and dilution is not perfect enough: an 
outdated map giving my vote less “weight” harms my outcome-related interests, 
but it does not harm me in quite the same way as a scheme in which I am blocked 
from casting a ballot.56 
The Court today frames malapportionment claims in terms of the “weight” of an 
individual’s vote57—an individual aggregation claim.58 But group aggregation 
interests are still doing the real normative work. The “weight” of my individual 
vote does not do much practical work for me. In particular, it does not actually tell 
me anything about my chances of being able to elect my candidate of choice.59 
Instead the weight of my vote is something much more artificial and abstract.60 
Perhaps there is an individualized interest at stake in being only one of 100,000 
constituents rather than one of 200,000 from the point of view of constituent 
services (an individual governance interest). But essentially what is going on here 
is that the Court has found an individualistic way to recast what are really the 
interests of equally numerous groups of citizens in electing their candidates of 
                                                                                                                 
601, 658–59 (2007). 
 55. Sims, 377 U.S. at 567. 
 56. The difference is especially obvious when the purported “debasement” of the 
individual right to vote amounts to some tiny fractional deviation from perfect 
equipopulation. See Issacharoff, supra note 5, at 609 (“[N]o credible individual rights claim 
could be made where districts numbering in the many thousands deviated from the ideal size 
by less than one percent.”); see also Gardner, supra note 19, at 452 (criticizing the Court for 
framing one-person-one-vote claims in terms of “some conception of voter dignity” even 
where the “indignity” in question is “trivially fractional”). 
  Still, there are transitional cases that lie at the edge of this distinction between denial 
and dilution. Altering the boundary of a town to exclude certain voters can prevent them 
from voting at all in local elections. This differs from the ordinary legislative redistricting 
case in which voters are simply moved from one district to another. See Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340, 347 (1960) (holding that altering the boundaries of Tuskegee, 
Alabama to exclude blacks was denial of the right to vote on account of race). 
 57. E.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 160−61 (1993) (explaining that the 
purpose of the equipopulation requirement is “so that each person’s vote may be given equal 
weight,” although this rule is “not an inflexible one”); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 2−3 
(1964) (in numerical vote dilution case, defining Georgia voters’ claim in terms of a right “to 
have their votes for Congressmen given the same weight as the votes of other Georgians”). 
 58. Such individual aggregation claims are a kind of hybrid at the intersection of 
individual participation and group aggregation. 
 59. Indeed, the Court has explicitly rejected attempts by litigants to offer models, such 
as the Banzhaf test, that would measure the individual’s chances of affecting the election 
outcome. See Bd. of Estimate of N.Y.C. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 698 (1989). 
 60. Under conditions of equal “weight” as the law defines it, a voter who lives in a 
district that happens to contain many noncitizens, children, or nonvoters will have far greater 
influence on election outcomes than a voter elsewhere. See Garza v. Cnty. of L.A., 918 F.2d 
763, 781–82 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J., concurring and dissenting in part). Individual 
influence is not protected. See also Levinson, supra note 51, at 1277–89 (detailing a variety 
of ways that one-person-one-vote does not result in districts with equal numbers of voters). 
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choice. The Court would have no reason to protect the weight of an individual vote 
if this group interest were absent.61  
This rich example illustrates that there are multiple interests at stake even in the 
most familiar election law claims—and even in claims framed in terms of “the right 
to vote”—but that some of these interests are stronger than others. In particular, in 
the aggregation domain, individual interests are not where the action is; it is group- 
and polity-level interests that really do the work. Contrast this with the participation 
domain. Here, it is the individual interest in participation—in casting a ballot—that 
serves as the paradigmatic interest from which the Court draws its analogies. 
The Court does not, and need not, always directly acknowledge the interests in 
play. Its doctrinal structures do not (and need not) always grant rights to the 
relevant interest bearers. But the doctrine must provide some way to account for the 
interests that are doing the normative work. When the Court does what it did in 
Colegrove—account for the relevant interests in such a myopic way as to leave the 
most normatively compelling interests out of the adjudicative calculus entirely—
the gap between doctrine and reality leads to pressure on the doctrine. In the end, 
misidentifying or omitting normatively central interests yields both bad doctrine 
and bad results. 
C. The Merits and Limits of Structuralism: A First Cut 
Disaggregating the interests of individuals, groups, and the polity as a whole 
illuminates both the power and the limits of structuralism. The case for adjudicating 
election law questions in wholly structural terms is at its strongest where the 
underlying interests at stake in the controversy are in fact interests of the whole 
polity. 
As structuralist scholars have noted, election law jurisprudence is replete with 
irreducibly polity-level interests. The “expressive harms” the Court identifies in 
racial gerrymanders are, as Pildes argues, “not the tangible burdens they impose on 
particular individuals but the way in which they undermine collective 
understandings.”62 Karlan has argued persuasively that both in the racial 
gerrymandering cases and in Bush v. Gore, “[t]he Court deploys the Equal 
Protection Clause not to protect the rights of an identifiable group of 
individuals . . . but rather to regulate the institutional arrangements within which 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. Karlan identifies that rare animal, the “purely individual” aggregation claim 
independent of group interests, in the supermajority (60%) requirement for bond issues that 
was challenged unsuccessfully in Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). See Karlan, supra 
note 29, at 1713 n.30. Plaintiffs argued that the 60% threshold gave more weight to negative 
votes than affirmative votes. Id. The Court rejected the argument because it “discern[ed] no 
independently identifiable group or category” of voters, “no sector of the population,” whose 
interests were harmed. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5. In effect, the Court rejected the claim because 
it correctly judged that there was no group aggregation interest here, and, without one, the 
importance of the individual aggregation interest was mysterious. 
 62. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive 
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 755 (1998); see also Pildes & Neimi, 
supra note 27, at 506–16. 
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politics is conducted.”63 In other words, the relevant interests here are not those of 
individuals or groups but the interests of the polity as a whole. In such cases, courts 
may invoke “rights” to trigger legal scrutiny of a challenged practice, but rights are 
not what courts ultimately weigh. 
The key insight of Issacharoff and Pildes in Politics as Markets was that the 
“discourse of individual rights and competing state interests” has often obscured 
the real stakes in controversies where the essential interests on both sides are 
structural.64 Cases challenging restrictions on fusion candidacies or write-in 
candidacies are primarily about the structure of political competition.65 Both sides 
in such cases make arguments about democratic structure: the pro-fusion and pro-
write-in sides advocate a democratic order that is more open to competition from 
outsiders and third-party candidates, while defenders of the restrictions advocate an 
order less open to such competition and ostensibly more “stable.” Although there 
are other individual and group interests in play in these cases, the main normative 
claims on both sides address these polity-level concerns. Yet the individual-rights-
versus-state-interests doctrinal framework leads courts to focus on the structural, 
polity-level interests on one side only—the side defending the regulations. Thus, in 
controversies of this kind, the structuralist critique has real analytic force. 
However, not all controversies have this shape. In particular, some interests are 
essentially individual in nature; they belong in the Column A of Table 1.66 These 
interests do not rise and fall with the treatment of any group or the polity as a 
whole. The most important of these interests is the individual citizen’s interest in 
her right to vote. 
In the new vote denial controversies that the next Part will discuss—the fights 
over such measures as voter identification requirements and registration list purges 
that aim to prevent fraud but also disenfranchise some legitimate voters—it is 
surprisingly easy to lose sight of the individual right to vote. In part this is because 
the main players in these controversies are almost never individual voters. They are 
usually political parties, from whose perspective all the real action is in the “group” 
column. To these highly experienced and litigious adversaries, what matters most is 
who will turn out to vote and what effects, if any, the proposed anti-fraud measures 
will have on the relative levels of participation of different political groups. 
Meanwhile, to many advocates and scholars, what matters about the new vote 
denial controversies is their overall effects on structural variables such as turnout 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection 
from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
There is broad agreement on this point in the academy, even among those who resist 
structuralism tout court. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 20, at 467 (agreeing that in such cases, 
the Court “couched its decision[s] in terms of individual rights” but in fact was concerned 
with broader, structural interests). 
 64. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 5, at 717. 
 65. See id. at 668–87. 
 66. Cf. Charles, supra note 5, at 1114 (“Structuralists sometimes lose sight of the fact 
that the ultimate point of judicial supervision of politics is to protect, operationalize, or give 
content to the individual right to self-government.”). But see, e.g., Gardner, supra note 19, at 
457–58 (“In democratic proceedings, the real party in interest is the public, not the individual 
voter.”). 
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and representation, as well as their effects on racial and political groups. None of 
these interests is the same as an individual voter’s interest in being able to cast a 
ballot and have it counted. Although a full discussion of the value of this individual 
interest will have to wait until Part III, the next Part will explain why taking this 
interest seriously makes a difference to both the doctrine and the jurisprudence of 
the new vote denial. 
II. ADJUDICATING THE NEW VOTE DENIAL CONTROVERSIES 
A. The Interests at Stake 
Across the landscape of the new vote denial controversies—from registration 
list purges to provisional ballot rules and from partisan challengers to photo 
identification requirements—the two sides’ main stated aims are clear: preventing 
fraudulent votes versus preventing disenfranchisement. But these general aims 
require some careful unpacking: they may stand for a variety of distinct interests. 
Some of these are truly individual interests, but others, even if stated in 
individualistic terms, are actually interests of groups or of the polity as a whole. 
1. Interests of Individuals, Groups, and the Polity in the New Vote Denial Cases 
First consider the interests of the polity as a whole. The first and most obvious 
reason to prevent fraudulent votes is that they might alter an election outcome, 
either if the number of fraudulent votes is large or if the margin of victory is 
small—and some margins of victory are very small. Outcome-altering fraud would 
be a major problem for the entire polity. Even if the probability of this occurring is 
not high, the whole polity has an interest in reducing that probability.67 We all 
benefit from making sure election outcomes are not altered by fraud, and it is not 
logically possible for you to enjoy an election whose outcome was safe from fraud 
while I do not. Thus, keeping election outcomes safe from fraud is, in the first 
instance, a polity-level aggregation interest. 
Both sides also point to other polity-level interests. Opponents of anti-fraud 
measures argue that such measures will dampen overall turnout (a polity-wide 
participation interest), or that they will distort turnout in such a way as to reduce 
representativeness (a polity-wide aggregation interest). Advocates of anti-fraud 
measures sometimes argue that they will improve voters’ “confidence” in the 
election process. As the Court put it in a 2006 case: “Voter fraud drives honest 
citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our government.”68 
Some press this claim further and argue that improving confidence and trust 
through measures such as voter identification requirements will increase overall 
turnout.69 Both of these claims lack empirical support. Available empirical 
evidence indicates that identification laws have no effect on voter confidence and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. The strength of this interest will depend on (a) just how small that probability is to 
begin with and (b) to what extent a new anti-fraud regulation actually reduces it. 
 68. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam). 
 69. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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that, in any event, an individual’s perception of the level of fraud has no effect on 
her likelihood of voting.70 Nevertheless, this turnout argument invokes a polity-
wide interest in the overall level of participation. 
Both sides also invoke group interests. Some partisans look favorably on 
tougher anti-fraud measures out of a view that their opponents generally engage in 
(more) fraud; therefore, they believe that reducing fraud will improve the prospects 
of electoral success for groups, like their own, that have (relatively) clean hands. 
This is a group aggregation interest, with the group typically being a political party 
or other faction.71 The strongest versions of this argument take the form of charges 
that the other party is engaged in massive, coordinated fraud.72 But leaving the 
effects of fraud itself on group electoral prospects entirely to one side, anti-fraud 
measures may have predictable side effects on group turnout—and therefore, on 
different groups’ chances of electing their candidates of choice. Depending on 
one’s perspective such effects might be a feature or a bug. Different courts 
evaluating the voter identification law at issue in Crawford noted correctly that 
“partisan considerations may have played a significant role in the decision to enact” 
the statute73 and, by the same token, in the plaintiffs’ decision to challenge the 
statute.74 
At the intersection of polity and group interests, a few structuralists advocate 
adjudicating the new vote denial claims on the basis of whether the regulations 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. See Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Vote Fraud in the Eye of the 
Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1751–58 (2008). Indeed, some evidence suggests that the group of 
voters who are disillusioned by the flawed machinery of the political process is 
disproportionately black; their concerns include voter suppression, fear that their votes will 
not be accurately counted, and concern about the anti-fraud agenda itself. See Ian Urbina, 
Democrats Fear Disillusionment in Black Voters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at A5 (citing 
polling data). 
  As far as the relationship between voter identification laws and turnout, there is 
some debate over whether sufficient data yet exists to draw firm conclusions, but there is 
certainly no evidence of a positive effect on turnout; some methodologies show a negative 
effect, but the effect may not be statistically significant. See generally Robert S. Erikson & 
Lorraine C. Minnite, Modeling Problems in the Voter Identification—Voter Turnout Debate, 
8 ELECTION L. J. 85 (2009). 
 71. Not always, however. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 72. For example, in 2000, Missouri Republican Secretary of State Matt Blunt accused 
his opponents of “a major criminal enterprise designed to defraud voters” and steal the 
election by holding the polls open late so that illegitimate voters could vote. Carolyn Tuft, 
Bond Wants Federal Investigation of Problems at City Polls—He Accuses Democrats of 
“Criminal Enterprise” in Keeping Polls Open Late—Democrats Criticize Election Board, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 10, 2000, at A1. 
 73. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 203 (2008) (Stevens, J.) 
(plurality opinion). In dissent on the Seventh Circuit panel in Crawford, Judge Evans called 
the law “a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain folks 
believed to skew Democratic.” Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 
(7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J., dissenting), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 74. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952 (Posner, J.) (“[T]he motivation for the suit is simply that 
the law may require the Democratic Party and the other organizational plaintiffs to work 
harder to get every last one of their supporters to the polls.”). 
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cause political distortion or skew—and, sometimes, whether that group effect was 
one that legislators intended. For example, some have proposed that courts should 
invalidate (or more strictly scrutinize) regulations that cause partisan 
entrenchment,75 or that “courts should apply strict scrutiny whenever a challenged 
law disproportionately disenfranchises people with an identifiable set of political 
preferences.”76 Such standards can be read to track either impact or intent. One 
circuit judge in Crawford argued that strict scrutiny ought to apply “when there is a 
serious risk that an election law has been passed with the intent of imposing an 
additional significant burden on the right to vote of a specific group of voters.”77 
This intent- or purpose-based standard raises many of the same difficult questions 
that have bedeviled the Court’s partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence: assuming 
that partisan advantage may legitimately play some role in legislators’ decisions 
about election regulations, it is difficult to clarify precisely the “limiting principle” 
that separates the “permissible” from the “invidious.”78 In practice, almost any 
regulation that causes a favorable turnout skew may be viewed as “imposing an 
additional significant burden” on some group of voters as compared to others. 
Thus, although legislative intent may play a useful role in the analysis of challenges 
to election regulations—for example, by coloring the evaluation of the state’s 
purported interest in the regulation—it is problematic for legislative intent to drive 
the entire analysis.79 
Finally, both sides invoke individual interests. The most basic argument against 
the anti-fraud measures is that they disenfranchise legitimate voters by burdening 
or violating their individual right to vote.80 Of course, groups also have an interest 
in protecting their members from disenfranchisement; the polity as a whole has an 
interest in safeguarding the rights of its members.81 But these interests are 
derivative of the individual voters’ interests. As individuals attempt to vote, they 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. See, e.g., Bryan P. Jensen, Comment, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board: 
The Missed Opportunity to Remedy the Ambiguity and Unpredictability of Burdick, 86 
DENV. U. L. REV. 535, 558 (2009). 
 76. Demian A. Ordway, Note, Disenfranchisement and the Constitution: Finding a 
Standard That Works, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1174, 1178 (2007). 
 77. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 484 F.3d 436, 437 (7th Cir. 2007) (Wood, 
J., dissenting from the denial of reh’g en banc), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 78. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 337–38 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 
Elmendorf, supra note 13, at 668–69. For a thorough argument against intent-based 
standards, see Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 843. 
 79. Even critics of deciding the validity of election regulations based on legislative 
intent acknowledge that legislative intent may usefully play some secondary role. See, e.g., 
Hasen, supra note 78, at 888–89. For example, obvious intent to entrench or shut out a 
political party ought to make us more skeptical of the purported (structural) state interest 
justifying an election regulation. But see infra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing 
the fact that courts are often reluctant to make such determinations). 
 80. See infra Part III (discussing individual voters’ interest in their right to vote in more 
detail). 
 81. Indeed, the polity’s collective interest in safeguarding its members’ right to vote has 
proved crucial in voting rights litigation in which the United States wished to intervene. 
Thanks to Owen Fiss for pointing this out. 
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succeed or fail one by one.82 Their right to vote does not rise or fall with the 
treatment of the group (or the polity as a whole), nor is it unindividuated among 
members of the group (or the polity). To say this is not to denigrate the polity’s 
interest, or groups’ interests, but to clarify the level on which the main action takes 
place.83 In general, when we focus on the interest in being able to cast a ballot that 
is counted, the basic interest bearer is the individual. 
2. Fraud-As-Dilution and Fraud-As-Disenfranchisement 
In recent years, proponents of anti-fraud measures have developed two 
innovative arguments that fraudulent votes themselves violate the rights of 
individual voters. These arguments move away from a focus on outcome-altering 
fraud and instead attempt to reconceptualize each fraudulent vote—even one 
fraudulent vote—as something that harms individual (legitimate) voters. The 
purpose of these moves is to rebut or counterbalance the charge that anti-fraud 
measures disenfranchise legitimate voters. These moves fight fire with fire, inviting 
courts to weigh both fraud and the disenfranchisement caused by anti-fraud 
measures as essentially commensurate violations of individual rights. 
First, advocates of anti-fraud measures offer the argument that fraud dilutes the 
votes of legitimate individual voters, reducing those votes’ “weight” in a manner 
analogous to malapportionment. On this view, even if we leave aside the possibility 
that fraud could alter an election outcome—which would vitiate multiple interests 
of groups and the whole polity—the weight of my individual vote is diluted 
whenever someone, somewhere in my district, has cast one fraudulent vote. Instead 
of being one out of a thousand votes, my vote is now one in 1001, even if the 
fraudulent vote goes to a write-in candidate with no chance of winning. This 
argument amounts to an individual aggregation claim. Senator Christopher “Kit” 
Bond, who emerged as a leader of the Republican anti-fraud efforts during the Help 
America Vote Act debate, put it simply: “Illegal votes dilute the value of votes cast 
legally.”84 
This argument is plausible, but its normative force is mysterious. First, if we are 
talking about dilution in terms of the power to affect outcomes, the claim proves 
too much: legal votes dilute the value of other votes cast legally. (If nobody else 
votes but me, I have complete power to choose my elected officials. It’s the other 
voters who get in the way.) Adding a fraudulent vote, from this perspective, is no 
different from adding a legitimate vote. Both dilute the abstract value of my vote by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. See Flanders, supra note 10, at 147 (“[G]roups may start movements in order to 
have the right to participate, but once this right is granted that right must be taken one person 
at a time . . . .”). 
 83. The group interest is only partly derivative of individuals’ interests. Even if I can 
personally cast a ballot, it affects my group interests if others in my group are 
disproportionately blocked from voting. See Overton, supra note 13, at 673–74 (“[P]hoto-
identification requirements that exclude legitimate voters dilute the political choices of not 
only those who are unable to produce photo identification but also their allies who do 
produce a photo-identification card.” (emphasis added)).  
 84. 147 CONG. REC. 3660–61 (2001) (statement of Sen. Christopher Bond debating the 
Safeguard the Vote Act). 
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adding one more. Either way, the important interests at stake here depend on 
election outcomes. Unless election outcomes are altered, my aggregation interests 
are unaffected: I still have the same chance of being able to aggregate my votes 
with others and elect my candidate of choice that I would have had absent fraud. 
Where outcomes are unaffected, my interest in the “weight” of my vote looks 
very much like the individual interest in the weight of a vote that the Court 
identified in one-person-one-vote cases—but here, the normatively crucial group 
aggregation interests are absent.85 No equally populous group gets more or less 
than its fair share of representation as a result of the one fraudulent vote (or a few 
fraudulent votes, as long as they are non-outcome-altering). There is no 
representational harm. On the other hand, where there is a chance that my candidate 
or party will actually lose the election because of fraud, my strong interest in 
preventing that very bad outcome is an interest that rises or falls with the interests 
of my party (or the group of supporters of my chosen candidate). In that case, my 
interest is much stronger, but it is actually a group interest, not an individual one. 
This dilution argument has now become a familiar part of the anti-fraud arsenal. 
But because dilution is not quite the same thing as disenfranchisement,86 the fraud-
as-dilution argument is not quite able to rebut the claim that anti-fraud measures 
disenfranchise legitimate voters. One line of attack available to the anti-fraud side 
is to argue that any voters disenfranchised by anti-fraud measures were not 
legitimate voters to begin with. In 2001, Senator Bond responded deftly to charges 
of disenfranchisement: “You may call me cruel and even discriminatory, but I will 
persist in trying to limit the voting franchise to human beings who are not dead 
yet.”87 In Georgia, the state representative who was the chief sponsor of that state’s 
photo identification law pressed the argument further. She told U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) voting section attorneys that “if there are fewer black voters because 
of this bill, it will only be because there is less opportunity for fraud.”88 This line of 
attack neatly undermines the disenfranchisement argument by asserting that no 
legitimate voters are actually being disenfranchised. But it depends on the 
implausible empirical premise that every single person disenfranchised by these 
laws is an illegitimate, fraudulent voter.89 
Some anti-fraud activists and legislators now also pursue a more direct line of 
attack: the claim that fraud itself disenfranchises individual voters by cancelling out 
their votes. This one-to-one cancellation is not the same as a one-in-1001 dilution. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See supra note 61. 
 86. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 87. Christopher S. “Kit” Bond, Op-Ed., ‘Motor Voter’ Out of Control, WASH. POST, 
June 27, 2001, at A25. 
 88. Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum: August 25, 2005, at 6, available at 
http://www.truthaboutfraud.org/pdf/08-25-05%20Georgia%20ID%20Preclearance%20 
Memo%20-%20DOJ%20Staff.pdf. This claim alarmed the DOJ line attorneys, a majority of 
whom ultimately recommended against preclearing the bill. See id. at 1, 51. However, the 
DOJ precleared the change despite this recommendation. See Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, 
Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 HOW. L.J. 785, 816–17 (2006). 
 89. One could, of course, argue that only voters with identification are “legitimate,” but 
this move is question begging. Procedural requirements do not determine who is eligible to 
vote. 
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The claim here is that one fraudulent vote actually takes away the right to vote of 
one legitimate voter, who, presumably, is voting for the opposing candidate. With 
this claim, and with the modern rhetoric of fraud as a form of disenfranchisement, 
proponents of tough anti-fraud measures are aiming squarely at the upper-left-
corner box of Table 1: individual participation. As Hans van Spakovsky put it: 
“Every vote that is stolen through fraud disenfranchises a voter who has cast a 
legitimate ballot in the same way that an individual who is eligible to vote is 
disenfranchised when he is kept out of a poll or is somehow otherwise prevented 
from casting a ballot.”90 
This argument is deeply flawed.91 As Part III will discuss, it is not true that my 
right to vote matters only because of its outcome effects: my right to vote matters in 
part because it enacts my inclusion as a full citizen. Suppose both of us are 
legitimate voters, and you go to the polls and vote against my preferred candidate. 
The outcome effect of my vote has indeed been counterbalanced, but I am no less a 
first-class, equal, voting citizen.92 From the point of view of inclusion, the situation 
differs radically from one in which I am, in von Spakovsky’s words, “kept out of a 
poll” or “otherwise prevented from casting a ballot.” 
Moreover, this fraud-as-disenfranchisement argument assumes that the 
fraudulent voter is voting against my candidate. In a contested two-party election, 
there will always be some legitimate voter for whom that assumption holds. But 
there are other legitimate voters whose votes’ outcome effects are magnified by the 
fraudulent voter’s vote. One must apparently conclude—through the looking glass 
of fraud-as-disenfranchisement—that such voters are doubly enfranchised. And in a 
way that is precisely the problem: political parties may fear that their opponents are 
gaining unfair extra numerical advantages through fraud. But at this point, we are 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. Publius, Securing the Integrity of American Elections: The Need for Change, 9 TEX. 
REV. L. & POL. 277, 278 (2005) (emphasis added). Hans von Spakovsky, a conservative 
election lawyer, published this law review article under the pseudonym “Publius” while 
working at the DOJ. See Dan Eggen, Official’s Article on Voting Law Spurs Outcry, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 13, 2006, at A19. 
  Senator Bond began to adopt this fraud-as-disenfranchisement rhetoric during the 
Help America Vote Act debate when he argued that “[t]here can be no graver example of 
disenfranchisement” than fraud. 147 CONG. REC. 15,851 (2001) (statement of Sen. 
Christopher Bond). Congressional Republicans emphasized this argument during the 2006 
debate over the Federal Election Integrity Act of 2006, a bill that would have imposed a 
federal voter identification requirement. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. 18,743 (2006) (statement 
of Rep. Mark Green) (“Every one of those illegal votes cancels out a vote legally cast, 
cancels out a vote from a citizen for whom that right is so precious . . . .”). 
 91. Gardner views the rise of this flawed fraud-as-disenfranchisement argument (along 
with the fraud-as-dilution argument) as a reason to reject the Court’s entire individual-rights-
based doctrinal approach in favor of structuralism. Gardner, supra note 19, at 458–63. But 
the real problem with fraud-as-disenfranchisement is that this argument mischaracterizes 
group and/or polity interests as individual interests; in that important way the fraud-as-
disenfranchisement argument differs from claims by individual voters who actually face 
disenfranchisement. 
 92. In theory, if fraud were so extreme and widespread that democratic elections became 
meaningless, one can imagine a case in which voting ceased to function as an enactment of 
full citizenship. This scenario is far removed from the new vote denial controversies. 
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talking about group aggregation interests, not individual participation interests. 
Fraudulent votes are bad for more than one reason, but they are not the same thing 
as disenfranchisement. 
Fraud-as-dilution and fraud-as-disenfranchisement have both made some 
notable inroads in recent court decisions. In 2000, the Missouri Court of Appeals 
reversed an injunction that had held polling places open late in St. Louis.93 The 
court held that as important as it is to ensure that “every properly registered voter 
has the opportunity to vote . . . equal vigilance is required to ensure that only those 
entitled to vote are allowed to cast a ballot. Otherwise, the rights of those lawfully 
entitled to vote are inevitably diluted.”94 In 2004, a federal district judge in Ohio 
was an early adopter of something like the fraud-as-disenfranchisement argument, 
in combination with the claim that perceived fraud hurts participation. “Where 
persons who are eligible to vote lose faith that their ballot will count,” the court 
wrote, “[t]hey may decline to exercise the franchise, thereby giving up the most 
fundamental right of our democracy as completely as if it had been taken from 
them forcibly.”95 In 2008, the Sixth Circuit characterized the Help America Vote 
Act as protecting votes from being “diluted” by fraud and explained that 
“[e]nabling the casting of one vote does little good if another voter fraudulently 
cancels it out.”96 
In 2006, the Supreme Court took a tentative step down this path in Purcell v. 
Gonzalez,97 a cryptic, brief opinion vacating a Ninth Circuit decision to enjoin 
enforcement of an Arizona voter identification law. The Court disclaimed any 
opinion about the merits of the case, and in dicta it correctly stated the main 
categories of interest at stake: “the State’s compelling interest in preventing voter 
fraud” (a polity-aggregation interest) was in conflict with “the plaintiffs’ strong 
interest in exercising the ‘fundamental political right’ to vote” (an individual-
participation interest).98 But at the same time, the Court also stated: “Confidence in 
the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our 
participatory democracy. Voter fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic 
process and breeds distrust of our government. Voters who fear their legitimate 
votes will be outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised.”99 This 
remarkable passage invokes, or at least suggests, several different claims. First, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. Missouri ex. rel. Bush-Cheney 2000, Inc. v. Baker, 34 S.W.3d 410, 411–12 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
 94. Id. at 413. Here, the purported dilution was from “improper[]” votes cast by those 
not “entitled to vote” who “were improperly permitted to cast a ballot after the polls should 
legally have been closed.” Id. at 413, 413 n.6. The fraud-as-dilution argument migrated from 
politics to the courts but also back the other way: Senator Bond grabbed hold of this judicial 
language and has quoted it repeatedly. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 95. League of Women Voters v. Blackwell, 340 F. Supp. 2d 823, 829 (N.D. Ohio 2004) 
(upholding Ohio’s refusal to allow certain first-time voters to use a regular, rather than a 
provisional, ballot). 
 96. Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 544 F.3d 711, 713 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(Sutton, J.), vacated on other grounds, 555 U.S. 5 (2008) (per curiam). 
 97. 549 U.S. 1, 1 (2006) (per curiam). 
 98. Id. at 4 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)). 
 99. Id. 
1314 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1289 
 
immediately after the quoted sentences, the Court quotes the “debasement or 
dilution” language from Sims, evoking the one-in-1001 fraud-as-dilution 
argument.100 Second, the passage makes a version of the polity-level claim that fear 
of fraud reduces participation and therefore, implicitly, that an anti-fraud measure 
might improve our “participatory democracy.”101 Finally, when it invokes the idea 
that legitimate votes might be outweighed by fraudulent votes and when it makes 
the singular claim that voters will “feel disenfranchised,” the Court at least gestures 
toward the one-to-one cancellation argument—fraud-as-disenfranchisement. 
Whether the Court truly embraced fraud-as-disenfranchisement in Purcell 
depends on how one reads the word “feel.” On the one hand, perhaps “feel” is a 
hedge: the Court saw that the one-to-one cancellation model of fraud-as-
disenfranchisement was an imperfect analogy and declined to embrace it. On the 
other hand, if we (incorrectly) believed that disenfranchisement itself were 
exclusively a symbolic, subjective harm, then the harm of being disenfranchised 
and the harm of feeling disenfranchised might essentially be the same. Robinson 
Everett, who brought the Shaw challenges in North Carolina, once suggested 
something like this line of attack.102 His clients, he said, “felt disenfranchised by 
the legislature’s . . . racial gerrymandering.”103 As Pam Karlan argued in response, 
“no pre-existing definition of ‘disenfranchisement’ . . . describes the Shaw 
plaintiffs’ situation. Feeling disenfranchised is not the same thing as being 
disenfranchised. Each of the Shaw and Cromartie plaintiffs was able to go to the 
polls and to cast a ballot for the candidate of his or her choice.”104 
3. Bypassing the Individual Right to Vote 
One or both sides in the new vote denial controversies invoke all of the 
following interests. On this chart, a plus sign indicates a reason that supports the 
anti-fraud proposals, while a minus sign indicates a reason against these proposals. 
Interests in italics are derivative of other interests. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1974)). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 632 (1993). 
 103. Robinson O. Everett, Redistricting in North Carolina—A Personal Perspective, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 1301, 1310 (2001). 
 104. Karlan, supra note 63, at 1350 (emphasis in original). Perhaps a better (if less pithy) 
way to state the point is this: the Shaw plaintiffs’ claim sounded in aggregation, not 
participation. The problem was not that the claim had some subjective as well as objective 
elements—rather, the problem was that it was not actually a claim of disenfranchisement at 
all. 
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Table 2: Interests at Stake in the New Vote Denial Controversies 
 
      Interest 
      Bearer:  
Interest:  
A. Individual B. Group C. Polity 
1. Participation 
- An individual 
voter’s right to 
cast her ballot 
and have that 
ballot counted 
 





ment” of fraud) 
(- Political parties’ and 
other groups’ interests 
in their members’ rights 
to cast ballots and have 
them counted) 
 
+/- Political parties’ and 
other groups’ interests in 
their group’s [absolute 
or relative] level of 
participation/turnout 
(- The polity’s interest 
in its members’ rights 
to cast ballots and have 
them counted) 
 
+/- The polity’s interest 
in a high overall level 
of participation/turnout 
 
+/- The polity’s interest 
in safeguarding voter 
confidence 
2. Aggregation 
(+ An individual 
voter’s interest in 
protecting the 




+/- Political parties’ and 
other groups’ interests in 
electing their candidates 
of choice 
 
+ Political parties’ 
interests in preventing 
opponents from stealing 
elections through fraud 
+ The polity’s interest 
in reducing the 
probability that an 
election outcome could 
ever be altered by fraud 
 
+/- The polity’s interest 
in avoiding political 
distortion or skew 
 
+/- The polity’s interest 
in the representative-




   
+ interests providing reasons for the anti-fraud proposals 
- interests providing reasons against the anti-fraud proposals 
(interests derivative of other interests) 
 
As the new vote denial controversies play out in legislatures and courts, 
different players have reasons to emphasize different interests on this chart. 
Political parties, who are common litigants in the new vote denial cases, have 
strong reasons to litigate to protect their group interests (Column B). Because 
partisan interests loom large in legislative decision making,105 these group interests 
often drive legislation as well. Norms of public reason, however, encourage 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2338–47 (2006). 
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partisans to state their goals in terms of the interests of the polity as a whole 
(Column C). Thus, debates about proposed changes in election administration 
whose real drivers may be partisan advantage usually take place on different 
terrain, as debates about the interests of the polity. 
Restating group interests, especially partisan interests, in terms of the public 
interest is a very familiar feature of legislative life. Courts are wary of looking too 
deeply into the partisan motivations that may in fact have prompted legislation 
(Column B) if the legislation also serves valid interests of the polity as a whole 
(Column C).106 Thus it is unsurprising that much of the legislative action in the new 
vote denial controversies consists of partisan maneuvering couched in terms of the 
interests in Column C. Structuralist scholars have likewise pressed courts toward 
viewing the new vote denial controversies in terms of “structural” benefits and 
burdens that affect the whole polity (Column C). These frames bypass the 
individual right to vote (top of Column A). 
Most election regulations place some burdens on the individual right to vote. 
The polity’s interests are often strong enough to justify those burdens. However, 
balancing an individual interest (Column A) against a structural one (Column C) 
differs in a fundamental way from answering the purely structural question of 
whether the competing interests in Column C alone have been balanced in the way 
that maximizes the overall social good. Of course, the polity has an interest in the 
inclusion of all its members (Column C, Row 1). But if the state is undermining 
one would-be voter’s full inclusion as a citizen in the polity, it does not necessarily 
address that problem to show that the state is doing so pursuant to a policy that was 
put in place with the aim of promoting the inclusion of some other people—or of 
the greatest number of people. Each voter’s interest in inclusion matters.107 
Advocates of anti-fraud measures seem aware of the distinct normative value of 
an individual’s right to vote. It is what gives these advocates a reason to press the 
fraud-as-dilution and fraud-as-disenfranchisement arguments: these moves 
challenge their opponents’ claims on the moral high ground of protecting the 
individual right to vote. Anti-fraud advocates have stronger and more 
straightforward arguments that are based on the interests of the polity in preventing 
fraud from altering election outcomes. But perhaps in order to incorporate and 
capture the disenfranchisement rhetoric of their opponents,108 and perhaps out of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (“[I]f a 
nondiscriminatory law is supported by valid neutral justifications, those justifications should 
not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may have provided one motivation for 
the votes of individual legislators.”). This acknowledgment of multiple legislative 
motivations underscores the difficulties involved in urging courts to evaluate election 
regulations primarily in terms of the motivations of legislators. See supra notes 78–79 and 
accompanying text. 
 107. See infra Part III.G. 
 108. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1330–31 
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claims . . . .”). 
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fear that courts will hold that the right to vote trumps the polity’s interest in fraud 
prevention, these advocates turn to fraud-as-dilution and fraud-as-
disenfranchisement arguments, attempting to recharacterize their claims in terms of 
protecting individual voters. 
Some opponents of the new anti-fraud measures have recently made parallel and 
opposite moves. Consider Spencer Overton’s focus on the likelihood of “erroneous 
election outcomes.”109 This argument challenges anti-fraud advocates’ claim to the 
moral high ground of protecting the “accuracy” or “integrity” of election results. 
Overton defines the accuracy of an election outcome in terms of how close it comes 
to an implicit baseline: the intentions of eligible voters who would in fact vote if 
not turned away or deterred by the anti-fraud measure under consideration.110 
While fraudulent votes could cause departures from this baseline, so could the 
disenfranchisement of eligible voters who are turned away because of anti-fraud 
measures. Overton’s argument is an important and sophisticated move. The 
likelihood of erroneous outcomes provides a yardstick capable of rendering total 
fraud and total disenfranchisement commensurable: both are simply factors that 
cause possible error in election outcomes. From a policymaking point of view, that 
is a very useful starting point. However, this argument, like other arguments that 
focus exclusively on polity-level interests, bypasses the individual voter’s interest 
in inclusion. Arguments of this kind collapse the issue of any one voter’s possible 
disenfranchisement into a data point in the calculus of predicted outcomes and/or 
turnout. 
B. Structuralism and Judicial Role 
Judge Richard Posner has begun to develop a distinctive jurisprudence of the 
new vote denial that involves adjudicating these controversies in entirely structural 
terms. Judge Posner treats both preventing fraud and protecting citizens from 
disenfranchisement as fundamentally structural; he frames the harm of 
disenfranchisement in terms of the polity’s interest in the aggregate level of 
turnout. Thus, in new vote denial cases, for Judge Posner, the right to vote weighs 
equally “on both sides of the ledger.”111 
In a 2004 case involving absentee ballot rules, and again in 2007 in Crawford, 
Judge Posner held that “the striking of the balance between discouraging fraud and 
other abuses and encouraging turnout is quintessentially a legislative judgment with 
which we judges should not interfere unless strongly convinced that the legislative 
judgment is grossly awry.”112 This unusually deferential standard (“strongly 
convinced,” “grossly awry”) appears to be unique to Judge Posner. But it should 
not come as a surprise. The task of balancing different and competing structural 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. Overton, supra note 13, at 635. 
 110. Id. (explaining that “erroneous election outcomes” may occur because of either type 
of error: fraudulent votes or the disenfranchisement or deterrence of eligible voters who 
would otherwise have voted). 
 111. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, 
J.), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 112. Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1131 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.). 
1318 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1289 
 
benefits and burdens that accrue to the polity as a whole does not sound like the 
kind of project that courts understand to be at the core of their expertise.  
Courts’ role-anxieties about making decisions among competing paradigms in 
democratic theory are longstanding and somewhat overblown. Despite Justice 
Thomas’s famously skeptical view of his colleagues’ “resort to political theory,”113 
the Court does inevitably make some use of political theory in resolving many 
election law claims.114 However, a court that frames election law claims in wholly 
structural terms, in effect confining the analysis to the polity column, avoids 
undertaking a particular kind of analysis that differentiates its role from that of a 
legislature: weighing the distinct claims of a plaintiff against a defendant’s 
defenses. Just as an individual-rights approach can erase certain structural values 
from consideration—as structuralist scholars correctly charge—the all-structural 
approach can have the effect of erasing the actual plaintiffs’ interests and 
circumstances from the adjudicative calculus. 
1. Structuralism and Individual Disenfranchisement 
Consider the following hypothetical: suppose all the talk of ballot “integrity” has 
made voters in a particular jurisdiction so concerned about fraud that many will 
stay home and refuse to participate115 unless they see signs of a state crackdown on 
illegal voting. Suppose the state can produce those signs by turning away every 
hundredth would-be voter, and suppose this results in a net increase in turnout.116 
Assuming a sufficient number of voters, the effect of this program on election 
outcomes is negligible. Only the outcome-independent right to participate of every 
hundredth voter is affected. If our analysis remained entirely in the structural mode, 
we would balance the participatory benefits of increased turnout, on the one hand, 
against the polity’s interest in the inclusion of one percent of its citizens, on the 
other. For a legislator, considering the interests of the whole polity in this way 
would hardly seem unreasonable. But no court would choose this approach. The 
outright disenfranchisement of random voters cries out for some analysis of those 
individual voters’ rights. 
It is a distinctive role of courts to protect the fundamental rights of individuals 
against the maneuverings of a hostile or indifferent state. Courts have a 
responsibility to do this in part because others will not. It is not always in the 
interests of the political branches and the political parties—whose partisans inhabit 
the political branches—to ensure that the law reflects equal concern and respect for 
all citizens, especially where some believe there is much to be gained from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 113. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 893 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[O]nly a resort 
to political theory . . . can enable a court to determine which electoral systems provide the 
‘fairest’ levels of representation or the most ‘effective’ or ‘undiluted’ votes to minorities.”). 
 114. See generally Charles, supra note 27 (arguing that courts should use political theory 
to decide election law cases, and that in any event, they cannot avoid doing so). 
 115. This aspect of the hypothetical is meant to be illustrative and is not realistic.   
 116. This raises some tricky questions about official candor: would anyone really be 
impressed with an integrity-promoting measure that officials admitted amounted to nothing 
more than random disenfranchisement? Let us leave these questions to one side. 
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burdening other citizens’ fundamental rights.117 A titanic clash of legislation and 
litigation between warring political parties across many fora may not always 
adequately account for some individuals’ fundamental right to vote. 
The basic theme of all the structuralist proposals for adjudicating the new vote 
denial controversies is that they invite courts to evaluate disenfranchisement in 
terms of interests of the polity as a whole: participation levels, representativeness, 
or perhaps accuracy or partisan fairness. From any of these perspectives, the overall 
burdensomeness of a law has nothing to do with the severity of the burden on any 
one voter. Of all the judges to evaluate the Indiana voter identification law, Judge 
Diane Wood was the only one to note this problem: 
[A]s a matter of law the Supreme Court’s voting cases do not support a 
rule that depends in part for support on the idea that no one vote 
matters. Voting is a complex act that both helps to decide elections and 
involves individual citizens in the group act of self-governance. Even if 
only a single citizen is deprived completely of her right to vote—
perhaps by a law preventing anyone named Natalia Burzynski from 
voting without showing 10 pieces of photo identification—this is still a 
“severe” injury for that particular individual.118 
Of course, we could imagine an even simpler law that states outright that a 
person named Natalia Burzynski can never vote. That law would fail almost any 
test. Even the most committed structuralist would likely balk at a jurisprudence that 
framed outright de jure disenfranchisement in structural rather than individual-
rights terms. Elmendorf allows that “strict scrutiny can be reflexively applied in 
constitutional challenges to de jure voter qualifications (laws that restrict the class 
of citizens to whom elected officials are supposed to be accountable) no matter how 
few in number the excluded citizens . . . .”119 But he draws a bright line separating 
such de jure qualifications from all other barriers, and he argues that all other 
barriers should be evaluated in structural rather than individual terms.120 In effect, 
Elmendorf takes the view that the formal right to vote is an individual right 
deserving strict scrutiny, but that the substantive right to vote should be evaluated 
at a structural rather than individual level. But as we shall see, there are good 
reasons for rejecting this sharp dichotomy.121 
Elmendorf argues that the structural approach is preferable to the 
“individualistic conception of voting rights” because the structural approach avoids 
opening a politically charged “Pandora’s Box of new constitutional claims” by 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (arguing that 
justice requires the law to treat individuals with equal concern and respect rather than 
reducing all questions of justice to questions of utilitarian welfare maximization).  
 118. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 484 F.3d 436, 438 (7th Cir. 2007) (Wood, 
J., dissenting dissenting from the denial of reh’g en banc), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). The 
dissent’s focus on whether the restriction was “severe,” id. at 437–38, applies the framework 
from Burdick. 
 119. Elmendorf, supra note 13, at 701. 
 120. Id. at 701–02. 
 121. See infra Parts III.B, III.D.  
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particular voters who are affected by a given regulation.122 He further argues that 
evaluating what constitutes a “severe” burden presents courts with an open-ended 
question that particular judges tend to resolve in predictably partisan ways, with 
most judges appointed by Democrats finding burdens such as voter identification 
laws severe and most judges appointed by Republicans finding them reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory.123 These are both strong arguments. I will discuss the 
Pandora’s box claim below. As to the problem of partisanship in judicial evaluation 
of election regulations, the objection proves too much: it applies to structural as 
well as individualistic approaches to these problems. We have already begun to see 
dramatic gaps, largely along partisan lines, in the kinds of evidence and 
conclusions judges are willing to embrace about the likely structural effects of 
election regulations. Indeed, some courts have already embraced the wholly 
unsupported partisan claim (repeated by many politicians) that imposing voter 
identification laws raises confidence in such a way that net participation will 
increase.124 Thus, while partisanship is a concern any time courts intervene in 
election law disputes, this concern provides no justification for choosing a purely 
structuralist approach over an approach that begins with individual rights claims.  
2. Data, Anecdote, and Individual Plaintiffs 
Proponents of structural approaches to the new vote denial controversies have 
issued urgent calls for more data and more empiricism on the part of courts.125 
Overton argues convincingly that judges without data tend to engage in “ad hoc, 
contestable conjecture,” citing anecdotes and inflammatory partisan arguments of 
dubious validity.126 More data is certainly needed if courts are to evaluate properly 
the magnitude of the state’s interest in measures that would prevent particular types 
of fraud. An individual-rights-versus-state-interests balancing test requires data of 
this type in order to accurately assess the strength of the state’s interests. It is far 
less clear that courts should wade into the social science of estimating how many 
people a law will disenfranchise—or even more speculatively, of attempting to 
predict the effects of anti-fraud regulations on turnout. Structuralist scholars would 
require courts to gather and rely on this second category of data along with the first. 
Courts have begun to demand both of these categories of data. In a brief 
concurrence in Purcell, Justice Stevens suggested that allowing elections to go 
forward in Arizona with the new identification law in place could help generate 
useful data to resolve “two important factual issues”: “the prevalence and character 
of the fraudulent practices that allegedly justify” the law and the “scope of the 
disenfranchisement” that the law will produce.127 Similarly in Crawford, Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 
 122. Elmendorf, supra note 13, at 702. 
 123. See id. at 647–48, 656 & app. 
 124. See supra note 70 and accompanying text; see also Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” or 
“Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What Difference Does it Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 
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 125. See, e.g., Overton, supra note 13, at 634–37. 
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 127. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 6 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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Souter argued in dissent that after he had shown that the “Voter ID law . . . 
threatens to impose serious burdens on the voting right . . . the next question . . . is 
whether the number of individuals likely to be affected is significant as well.”128  
In the course of his compelling evisceration of courts’ use of anecdotes to 
support findings that fraud is a significant phenomenon, Overton favorably cites 
Judge Posner for articulating a way in which data is better than anecdote: “The 
significance of a story of oppression depends on its representativeness . . . . [T]o 
evaluate policies for dealing with the ugliness we must know its frequency, a 
question that is in the domain of social science rather than of narrative.”129 
Legislators and policymakers indeed ought to know something about the frequency 
of a given “ugliness” before implementing costly measures to reduce it. Courts also 
need this same information to evaluate the magnitude of the polity’s interests that 
justify regulation. However, abstracting away from a particular “story of 
oppression” is a highly unusual, and problematic, way for a court to evaluate an 
individual’s claim that the state is violating her fundamental rights. 
Consider Kathleen Weinschenk, the lead plaintiff in a pre-Crawford challenge to 
a voter identification law in Missouri.130 Weinschenk, a woman with cerebral palsy, 
testified that she could not truthfully swear (as required by the statute for her to cast 
a provisional ballot) that by reason of her disability alone, she was entirely unable 
to obtain photo identification.131 Nonetheless, she testified, it would be extremely 
difficult for her to obtain it, largely because it was hard for her to procure a birth 
certificate from her birth state of Arkansas.132 Other individual plaintiffs and 
affiants testified that name changes, mobility problems, out-of-state birth certificate 
issues, and other combinations of particular, individualized circumstances made it 
difficult for them to jump through the hoops required to generate the documents the 
state demanded.133  
Weinschenk’s “narrative” was not just a “story of oppression.” It was an actual 
claim of oppression by a plaintiff in court. Her story was not an anecdote offered in 
the spirit of illuminating underlying population data—a task for which anecdotal 
narratives are indeed of limited value. Her story was before the court because the 
government’s policy caused her a personal injury from which she sought relief. The 
significance of her story does not depend on its representativeness. It depends 
instead on the severity of the burden that Missouri’s photo identification law placed 
on her right to vote.  
It would be different if her claim were one of the many election law claims 
concerning group or polity interests, such as a vote dilution claim, a claim 
concerning signature requirements for ballot access, or a claim that a districting 
map was gerrymandered in an overly race-conscious way. Unlike those claims, 
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Weinschenk’s claim did not depend on any group interest or structural value. Her 
claim was simply that she, personally, was being excluded from the circle of full 
and equal citizens entitled to cast a ballot. Recasting this claim as a problem of 
democratic structure—such as a problem of reducing turnout or 
representativeness—disguises it and drains away much of its force. 
C. In Defense of Balancing Individual Rights Against State Interests in the New 
Vote Denial Cases 
This subpart offers a defense of the much-maligned doctrinal approach the Court 
has begun to apply in the new vote denial cases: a flexible balancing approach that 
weighs the magnitude of the state’s interests against the burden on an individual’s 
right to vote. The doctrinal underpinnings of this approach were developed in cases 
that had little to do with the inclusion of individual voters. Courts have only just 
begun to apply this approach to the new vote denial controversies; so far, the 
doctrine has not yet developed to the point that it offers clear guidance. But through 
future as-applied challenges by individual plaintiffs, this approach has the potential 
to enable courts to isolate and weigh serious burdens on citizens’ rights, and 
remedy those burdens, without becoming overly embroiled in comprehensive 
policy debates about how best to optimize the overall voting regime. 
1. Burdens on an Individual Right 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, in cases such as Dunn v. Blumstein134 and 
Kramer v. Union Free School District135 and statutes such as the 1975 VRA 
Amendments,136 Congress and the Court transformed the right to vote from a 
formal, theoretical guarantee into a substantive entitlement of citizenship.137 By the 
time the Court decided Crawford in 2008, those precedents were thirty or forty 
years old. In the intervening years, the Court had surprisingly few opportunities to 
develop its jurisprudence of vote denial.  
It did develop jurisprudential approaches to a series of other, related areas of 
election law. One of those areas was ballot access. In Anderson v. Celebrezze,138 
the Court held that Ohio’s early filing deadline, which required independent 
presidential candidate John Anderson to submit his petitions in March in order to 
appear on the ballot in November, “placed an unconstitutional burden on the voting 
and associational rights of Anderson’s supporters.”139 Justice Stevens, writing for 
the Court, held that there was no “litmus-paper test”140 that could “separate valid 
from invalid restrictions.”141 Instead, courts must weigh “the asserted injury to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (striking down a one-year durational residency requirement). 
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2011] EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 1323 
 
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to 
vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications 
for the burden imposed by its rule.”142 Such a flexible approach was necessary in 
Anderson because it would make little sense for the Court to subject every filing 
deadline to the same level of scrutiny. The length of a filing deadline is a 
continuous variable. As the length increases, the relevant burdens gradually become 
more severe and more likely to outweigh the state’s interests. Thus, a relatively 
flexible balancing test was required. 
Later, in Burdick v. Takushi, the Court upheld Hawaii’s rule disallowing write-
in voting against a challenge, this time by an individual voter, Alan Burdick, rather 
than a candidate.143 Burdick argued unsuccessfully that the ban burdened his First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of free expression and association.144 The Court 
elaborated on its holding in Anderson, noting that “to subject every voting 
regulation to strict scrutiny . . . would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that 
elections are operated equitably and efficiently”; thus, the “more flexible standard” 
of Anderson applies.145 Neither Anderson nor Burdick concerned any individual 
citizen’s right to cast a ballot. Anderson focused first, on John Anderson’s rights as 
a candidate, and second, on his supporters’ (related) “associational choices 
protected by the First Amendment.”146 Similarly, while Burdick “characterized” his 
case “as a voting rights rather than [a] ballot access case,” the rights in question 
were the same ones at issue in Anderson: voters’ First Amendment rights to free 
expression and association.147 
In light of this history it may seem odd at first blush that the Court turned to 
Anderson and Burdick as precedents in Crawford, a case concerning burdens on an 
individual voter’s basic right to cast a ballot.148 But Anderson and Burdick were 
useful to the Court in Crawford. Although they concerned a different set of 
individual rights—expression and association, rather than participation—these 
cases began to develop a jurisprudence of the right shape to adjudicate the new vote 
denial cases.  
This is not to say that Anderson and Burdick were stellar examples of judicial 
craft. This doctrinal approach of balancing individual rights against state interests 
was an imperfect fit for the ballot access cases in which it originated. Issacharoff 
and Pildes among others have convincingly critiqued Burdick’s shallow, favorable 
account of the state’s purported interest in keeping independent write-in candidates 
away from the general election ballot.149 As Issacharoff and Pildes argue, this 
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jurisprudence bypasses the structural value of increasing competition and 
disrupting partisan lockups that may be the best reason to favor the plaintiffs in 
those cases and some others.150 But in the new vote denial cases, beginning with 
Crawford, this doctrinal approach has found an application to which it is ideally 
suited. Anderson and Burdick provided a doctrinal approach of the appropriate 
shape for the new vote denial cases in the sense that these cases began to make the 
“hard judgments” about whether structural state interests were sufficiently weighty 
to justify various burdens on individual rights.151 Flexible balancing doctrines of 
this kind are not nearly as common as one might assume.152 
Some—in particular Justice Scalia—have tried to read into Burdick a binary 
threshold inquiry in which each regulation is either “severe” (triggering strict 
scrutiny) or reasonable and nondiscriminatory (triggering rational basis review).153 
Imposing this kind of binary threshold test would simply hide the ball. Justice 
Stevens’s approach in Anderson and in Crawford acknowledges the unavoidable 
need to engage in careful balancing of individual rights against state interests.154 In 
particular, this means that even where a burden is insufficiently severe to trigger the 
strictest scrutiny, a standard approaching a narrow tailoring analysis, perhaps 
“narrow tailoring light,” along with a showing of an important interest or a 
“compelling interest light,” is required. As the Court put it in Anderson: “[T]he 
Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of [the State’s] 
interests, it must also consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary 
to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”155 
The reason such balancing is necessary—and inevitable156—is that almost all 
election regulations impose burdens on at least some voters’ right to vote. Consider 
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a claim that the polls’ early closing hour imposes a burden on a plaintiff’s right to 
vote. The strength of this claim will obviously vary depending on whether the polls 
are closing at 2 p.m., 5 p.m., or 8 p.m.; all closing times place some burden on 
voters, but the 2 p.m. burden is much more severe. The variable here is continuous, 
like the filing deadline in Anderson. No single, binary “litmus-paper test” can 
reliably “separate valid from invalid restrictions.” Similarly, consider a claim that 
there are insufficient polling locations. The strength of such a claim will often be 
weak, but that will depend on how many polling places the state has provided in 
relation to the expected number of voters, the geography of the area, whether no-
excuse absentee voting is available to the plaintiff bringing the claim,157 and so on. 
The Anderson/Crawford doctrinal framework usefully requires that courts weigh 
such considerations on the plaintiff’s side not in isolation but in relation to the 
strength of the state’s interests (which in these cases will primarily be an interest in 
containing costs). 
There is something philosophically unsatisfying about a balancing test that 
involves balancing two incommensurable things: burdens on an individual right, 
and interests of the state or polity. Such balancing may seem overly open ended, 
inviting arbitrary decisions. But that is largely because courts are only beginning to 
develop this jurisprudence; the precedents that will give it shape do not yet exist. 
Crawford was the first new vote denial case to reach the Court. Future cases will 
need to develop a jurisprudence that can guide “hard judgments” by providing 
benchmarks against which future burdens and interests can be measured.  
As courts develop these precedents, they will not be writing on a blank slate. As 
Part III will discuss, existing voting rights law provides some significant guidance 
on the question of why and in what ways the individual right to vote matters. This 
background should provide the conceptual framework for future case law weighing 
different burdens on that right and deciding when they are sufficient to overcome 
the state’s interests. The other materials from which courts will fashion this 
jurisprudence are more case specific: the circumstances of individual plaintiffs 
vary, and by focusing on the particular plaintiffs rather than on structural arguments 
supporting the plaintiffs’ side, courts can begin to assess the character and 
magnitude of different burdens plaintiffs face. For this to happen, courts need 
plaintiffs who will challenge election regulations as applied to them. 
2. As-Applied Challenges and Multiple Paths to Voting 
Many election regulations will impose a burden on some voter that is relatively 
severe. Critics of the individual-right-to-vote approach to adjudicating the new vote 
denial controversies therefore worry that focusing on claims by individual voters 
opens up a Pandora’s box of challenges that would invalidate a large portion of 
state election laws unless judges set limits on these claims in some ad hoc, 
relatively lawless way.158 
                                                                                                                 
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689–90 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Burdick, among other 
cases, as precedent for a “proportionality” approach to “interest-balancing” in American 
law); see also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402–03 (2000) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (similarly citing Anderson). 
 157. See infra note 323. 
 158. See, e.g., Elmendorf, supra note 13, at 663–66. 
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This worry is misplaced. The scenario in which most election regulations fail 
because they severely burden one idiosyncratic voter would be a scenario in which 
each challenge is a facial challenge.159 In Crawford, the Court made it clear that it 
wants to hear plaintiffs challenge the laws as applied to them.160 This may 
significantly circumscribe the effects of plaintiffs’ challenges in the new vote 
denial cases.161 It will make it much more difficult for a group like the Democratic 
Party, whose primary interest may be in total partisan turnout, to use the particular 
individual circumstances of citizens like Kathleen Weinschenk to invalidate entire 
regulations that dampen or skew turnout. For such groups, the individual right to 
vote is merely a vehicle for advancing group interests. 
But in comparison to facial challenges aimed at invalidating entire regulatory 
schemes, as-applied challenges could turn out to be more precise instruments for 
vindicating individual voters’ rights. A successful facial attack on a photo 
identification law, aimed at replacing the law with some less intrusive method of 
identifying voters such as signature matching, would greatly alleviate the extreme 
burdens on the voters who have the toughest time qualifying for the identification 
cards. But presumably under the resulting signature-match system, some other 
(likely much smaller) group of voters would actually face heavier burdens than 
before: for example, voters who by reason of disability cannot make a consistent 
signature mark.162 Choosing one best method for everyone seems to lead inexorably 
toward counting up the number of people disenfranchised instead of taking each 
voter’s rights seriously. This suggests that if we are thinking exclusively in terms of 
choosing one best method by which everyone must vote, we are thinking about the 
problem in the wrong way.  
Every jurisdiction currently offers multiple routes to casting a ballot. Protecting 
the rights of each individual as a full, equal citizen may involve expanding the list 
of distinct routes or expanding access to existing routes. Relief in as-applied 
challenges is not limited to the plaintiffs. It need not be limited to the set of citizens 
whose circumstances are a precise match for those of the plaintiffs. However, the 
promise of as-applied challenges will not be realized if courts define classes so 
narrowly that endless piecemeal litigation is required. The Court’s jurisprudence of 
as-applied challenges in election law cases is still in its infancy.163 Depending on 
how it develops, this jurisprudence could turn out to be nothing more than a barrier 
aimed at making voting rights litigation prohibitively difficult, or it could yield a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. This is not Elmendorf’s assumption. See id.  
 160. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 189 (holding only that “the evidence in the record is not 
sufficient to support a facial attack on the validity of the entire statute” but leaving open a 
possibility of a future as-applied challenge). 
 161. See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
873, 880–81 (2005) (arguing that the facial and as-applied challenges are more of a 
continuum than a dichotomy, but noting the general rule that as-applied challenges allow the 
challenged rule to be enforced in some circumstances). 
 162. See, e.g., Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 206–07, 209 (Mo. 2006) 
(discussing one plaintiff’s inability to make a consistent signature mark due to a disability). 
 163. See generally Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: 
The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme 
Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2009). 
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jurisprudence that takes seriously the specific burdens on the rights of different 
voters in different situations.164 
If a court begins from the premise that each individual citizen has a 
fundamental, individual right to cast her ballot and have it counted, the question is 
not whether a given regulation generally disenfranchises more people than it helps. 
The question is whether, and by what routes, the plaintiff will be allowed to cast 
her ballot. Once that question is answered, other voters should generally be allowed 
to follow the first voter’s path unless the state has countervailing interests that 
justify restricting the path in some way to a specific group similar to the first 
voter.165 
For example, if a plaintiff comes forward who will be disenfranchised by a 
photo identification law, a court should create another route by which that person 
can vote on election day, unless sufficiently weighty state interests make this 
impossible. The Indiana law in fact offered such a route, although it involved its 
own serious burdens.166 Rather than strike down the whole photo identification 
system on the basis of the inadequacy of its alternate route, a court could instead 
expand the alternate route. For example, it could hold that the plaintiffs before it, 
and some as-yet-undetermined set of others similarly situated, can cast provisional 
ballots without identification if they sign an affidavit at the polls attesting that they 
are who they say they are and that they lack identification.167 The court could hold 
that officials should count such provisional ballots unless there is evidence—such 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. The Court’s early jurisprudence of as-applied challenges in election law cases 
invokes two different ways in which a challenge might be “as applied”: (a) post-enforcement 
rather than pre-enforcement, or (b) as applied to subsets of voters rather than to everyone. 
See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 774 (2009). Of these, only (b) does the work of making vote denial 
jurisprudence more attentive to differences in voters’ needs and situations. There is some 
evidence that the Court’s early jurisprudence of as-applied challenges in election law cases 
focuses on (a) as well. See id. at 780–81 (describing the Court’s justifications for rejecting 
facial challenges in two election cases, which include the need to wait for evidence of how a 
law operates in practice). Focusing courts’ attention on post-enforcement rather than pre-
enforcement review presents serious problems in the election law context because of the 
particular difficulties post-election relief entails. 
 165. For example, once a state has determined the conditions under which it will allow 
some voters to vote early or absentee, the question should be the weight of the state’s 
interests in restricting those paths. Eliminating needless restrictions on the use of existing 
routes to casting ballots can greatly alleviate, if not entirely solve, many individualized 
problems. See, e.g., Elmendorf, supra note 13, at 664–66 (listing some difficult hypothetical 
claims by individual voters about particular burdens, many of which arise only because early 
and/or absentee voting are highly restricted). 
 166. See Crawford, 553 U.S. 181, 216–18 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing the 
burden on voters of making a separate trip to the county seat if they want their provisional 
ballots to be counted and then signing an affidavit attesting that they are “indigent” or have 
religious objections to being photographed). 
 167. The scope of the “similarly situated” group entitled to relief matters a great deal 
here. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 163, at 1673 (concluding that even within the “as-
applied” framework, “broader relief beyond that narrowly tailored to a plaintiff’s 
circumstances ought ordinarily to be available”). 
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as a non-matching signature—that suggests any doubt about the voter’s identity, in 
which case further investigation is required. 
A state in Indiana’s position could argue that it has a strong interest in 
preserving its current extra-trip-to-the-county-seat rule (and its strange rule 
requiring voters to attest that they are “indigent”). The state would have to offer 
interests that outweigh the additional burdens this regime imposes on the plaintiffs’ 
rights. Similarly, the state could offer interests that justify limiting the set of 
“similarly situated” citizens eligible to pursue this new or revised route, from a 
broad category such as “those who lack identification” to a narrower category such 
as “those for whom procuring a birth certificate presents a burden.” The question is 
simply whether the state’s interests justify these limits. 
In Connecticut, in November 2008, over 27,000 eligible but unregistered voters 
took advantage of a provision of state law allowing them to cast a ballot for 
president and vice president (and no other offices) by appearing at their town 
clerk’s office before the close of the polls on election day.168 The process and 
requirements are essentially the same as those for registering to vote.169 From the 
point of view of inclusion, it is fair to ask why the state is excluding these 
individuals from participating in non-presidential elections. In 2005, a federal 
district court upheld this distinction against a challenge, holding that “the 
Connecticut General Assembly has apparently decided that, whatever benefits 
election-day registration might provide in terms of increasing voter turnout, those 
benefits are . . . outweighed by the State’s interest in minimizing fraud, crowding, 
and confusion at the polls.”170 The court declined to question the legislature’s 
judgment about how best to “strik[e] the appropriate balance between promoting 
smooth and accurate elections, on the one hand, and encouraging voter turnout, on 
the other . . . .”171 Framing the issue in these essentially structural terms, the court 
viewed the only possible remedy as eliminating Connecticut’s registration deadline 
and replacing it with a system of election-day registration.172 The court may have 
been prompted to adopt this view of the case by the plaintiffs, who proffered 
extensive expert testimony about the structural benefits of election-day regulation, 
in particular the positive relationship between election-day regulation and 
turnout.173 If so, those structural arguments backfired badly. The court understood 
the plaintiffs to be asking the court “to re-weigh the competing public interests—in 
Learned Hand’s famous words, to assume the role of a ‘third legislative 
chamber’—and impose election-day registration by fiat upon the citizens of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. E-mail from Michael Kozik, Office of the Connecticut Secretary of State, to author 
(Mar. 20, 2009) (on file with author); see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-158c (West 2009). 
 169. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-158d (requiring applicants for a special 
“presidential ballot” to attest in writing to their age, citizenship, residency, and the fact that 
they have not “forfeited [their] electoral privileges because of conviction of a disfranchising 
crime”), with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-23g(e) (requiring regular voter registration 
applications to be signed and dated and show the applicant’s age, citizenship, and residency). 
 170. ACORN v. Bysiewicz, 413 F. Supp. 2d 119, 124 (D. Conn. 2005). 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id. at 133–36. 
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Connecticut.”174 In response, the court invoked Judge Posner’s unusually 
deferential standard that “we judges should not interfere unless strongly convinced 
that the legislative judgment is grossly awry.”175 
Although the district court’s reasoning was careful and credible, it ultimately 
answered the wrong question. The question should have been whether sufficiently 
weighty interests of the state justified limiting the alternate route Connecticut 
already offered to “presidential ballots” alone. The court first ought to have asked 
whether the state’s interests justified this limit as applied to individual voters like 
one of the plaintiffs, who found herself in the position of voting the “presidential 
ballot” only because she believed, in good faith but, as it turned out, mistakenly, 
that she had registered in her new jurisdiction.176 From the point of view of such 
individual voters, who have already provided the state with all the usual 
information required for registration, the question is why the state is not including 
them as full, voting citizens for most federal and state offices.177 
This is a type of work that courts are accustomed to undertaking: deciding, on 
the basis of the facts of an individual plaintiff’s case, whether the burdens the state 
has placed on individual rights are justified by the state’s interests, or whether some 
other route to casting a ballot needs to be widened or created. Courts are less 
comfortable deciding on massive structural reforms that alter the way everyone 
votes in the hope of striking a better balance between vital but competing structural 
interests.178 That is why a lawsuit was an unlikely route to election-day registration 
in Connecticut. 
3. Two Cheers for Crawford 
These considerations lead me to a qualified defense of much of the Court’s 
approach in Crawford. The plurality opinion correctly states the shape of the 
interests it is balancing: the polity’s interest in preventing fraud against an 
individual voter’s interest in avoiding disenfranchisement. Crawford does not 
transmute individual disenfranchisement into a collective interest in turnout. Nor 
does it reframe fraudulent votes as a mysterious form of “disenfranchisement” or as 
a form of dilution. It asks whether the state’s interests were “sufficiently weighty to 
justify the limitation” on the individual right.179 
                                                                                                                 
 
 174. Id. at 124 (emphasis omitted).  
 175. Id. (quoting Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1131 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.)). 
 176. Id. at 147. 
 177. Perhaps the state’s interests could have justified this exclusion. But the judge found 
the regulation sufficiently “reasonable and nondiscriminatory” that he never closely 
scrutinized those interests. Id. at 154. 
 178. Cf. Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law: Partisan Gerrymandering and 
a Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1112–17, 1119–20 
(2007) (discussing courts’ unwillingness to answer structural questions, even when they are 
willing to ask them). 
 179. Crawford, 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–
89 (1992)). The opinion did embrace the empirically unsupported premise that anti-fraud 
measures increase “public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process” which in turn 
“encourage[] citizen participation.” Id. at 197. 
1330 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1289 
 
The most serious harm of fraud is the potential harm the whole polity might 
suffer: the harm that an election could be stolen by fraud. This has implications for 
the kind of fraud the state has the strongest interests in preventing: fraud by the 
corrupt officeholders, election officials, and political organizations that have the 
potential to alter many votes or stuff boxes with many illegal ballots.180 That is not 
to say that there is no interest in preventing and deterring the kind of small-time, 
individual-voter fraud that was the target of the voter identification law in 
Crawford. But it is important to be specific. One reason I can offer only two cheers 
for Crawford is that its treatment of the government’s interest in preventing fraud 
was not sufficiently specific about what kinds of fraud the law would prevent (as 
Justice Souter pointed out in dissent).181 
The more significant problem with Crawford is that despite correctly framing 
the problem—balancing the individual right to vote against the state’s interests—
the Court sometimes lapsed into a structural analysis of the interests on both sides. 
Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality upholding the law, found the plaintiff’s 
evidence wanting in two respects, only one of which is consistent with the 
individual-rights-versus-state-interests framework. He found that the record did not 
provide enough of a basis to determine the severity of the burdens on the right to 
vote, especially the burden on voters who are indigent or who have religious 
objections to being photographed.182 But he also repeatedly noted that the record 
did not show “how common the problem is”—that is, how many people would be 
affected by a given burden.183 The Court was far more preoccupied than it should 
have been—given the plurality’s correct statement of the interests at stake—with 
such questions of how many.184 
But it could hardly have been otherwise. The litigants in Crawford did not 
include any actual individuals who had been excluded from full citizenship in the 
polity. The first of the consolidated lawsuits in the case was filed by the Indiana 
Democratic Party,185 whose standing depended, first and foremost, at least in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. See Flanders, supra note 10, at 92, 97, 132–37 (arguing that minute amounts of 
fraud are comparable to “noise” in the election results, whereas “massive” fraud presents a 
serious structural danger). 
 181. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 224–33 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that although the 
state has a general interest in preventing fraud, this statute addresses only a single, highly 
“unlikely” form of fraud). 
 182. Id. at 201 (Stevens, J.) (“The record says virtually nothing about the difficulties 
faced by either indigent voters or voters with religious objections to being photographed.”). 
 183. Id. at 202. 
 184. Justice Stevens engaged in a lengthy back-and-forth with Justice Souter regarding 
such demographic questions as “how many indigent voters lack copies of their birth 
certificates,” disputing Justice Souter’s inferences as “[s]upposition based on extensive 
Internet research.” Id. at 202 n.20. Questions of “how many” similarly preoccupied the lower 
courts. Judge Posner held that the “fewer the people harmed by a law, the less total harm 
there is to balance against” the interests of the state. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 
472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, J.), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). That balance 
weighs structural interests. “Total harm” is of only very indirect relevance to the question of 
whether a burden on one individual’s right to vote is justified. 
 185. Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782–83 (S.D. Ind. 2006), 
aff’d sub nom. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 
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view of the Seventh Circuit, on the increased resources it would likely have to 
expend to enable its members to vote, and only secondarily, almost as an 
afterthought, on “the rights of those of its members who will be prevented from 
voting by the new law.”186 Various Justices nonetheless tried to conjure up the 
missing individuals whose interests were at stake in the case. Justice Souter urged 
the Court to consider “[r]ecord evidence and facts open to judicial notice” in order 
to estimate the numbers of individuals whose rights were severely burdened by the 
law.187 Justice Breyer mostly eschewed numerical estimates in favor of estimating 
burdens on typical “nondriver” voters.188 None of this was necessary. What the 
Court needed was some individual voters who faced the prospect of 
disenfranchisement, preferably in the role of plaintiffs. In their absence, the Court 
had no choice but to work like a legislature, using available analytic tools to get as 
solid a grip as possible on either the aggregate scope of the problem or an average 
or typical instance of it. 
Crawford opened up the possibility of a different and more productive form of 
litigation by inviting future litigants to bring as-applied rather than facial 
challenges. Here, Crawford may have done the court system, and litigants, a 
service. It nudged courts’ role away from the broad structural evaluation and 
redesign of election administration regimes and toward a clear focus on whether 
individual voters are being excluded. To be sure, this narrower role will involve 
courts deeply in adjudicating—critics would say micromanaging—the burdens 
regulations place on particular voters and groups of voters. Judges will continue to 
see these issues through lenses somewhat colored by partisanship, which is 
probably inevitable. But litigants will be able to step away from broad policy 
arguments such as those focused on increasing turnout, with all the social-scientific 
uncertainty such arguments entail, in favor of a clear focus on the burdens on 
individual voters’ rights. 
To make the as-applied approach a viable means of adjudicating the new vote 
denial, courts will need to get several things right in doctrinal areas that are beyond 
the scope of this Article. They will need to avoid defining the classes affected by 
each as-applied challenge in such a narrow way that litigation becomes entirely 
impractical; they will need to allow pre-election as-applied challenges and/or 
forward-looking injunctive relief to avoid the problem of meaningless post-election 
remedies. So far, the Court has sent mixed signals. In Crawford, the future as-
applied challenges that the Court invited would likely be challenges by some subset 
of all voters.189 But in an earlier case that was not a vote denial case, the Court 
appeared to use “as applied” in a different way, to mean post-enforcement.190 We 
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 186. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 951 (Posner, J.). Plaintiffs in the other consolidated suit 
included officeholders and various organizations representing poor, homeless, minority, 
and/or elderly voters. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. at 783. 
 187. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 218 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. at 238 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 189. See id. at 189 (“[T]he evidence in the record is not sufficient to support a facial 
attack on the validity of the entire statute . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
 190. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 445, 
450 (2008) (holding that Washington’s top-two primary system was not facially invalid, but 
that an as-applied challenge might be brought once the statute had actually been 
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will find out in the next few years to what extent the Court is serious about making 
as-applied challenges a viable method of adjudicating burdens on the individual 
right to vote, and to what extent the Court’s newly articulated preference for as-
applied challenges is merely a means of eliminating vote denial claims by 
rendering them narrow, costly, and/or ineligible for meaningful relief.191 One 
implication of the argument of this Part is that this is an area in which the new vote 
denial cases ought to come apart from many other categories of election law claims. 
In the new vote denial cases, as-applied challenges have the potential to vindicate 
the rights of the individual voters who face the heaviest burdens by carving out 
appropriate exceptions for them. In many other kinds of election controversies, the 
main injuries are actually to the interests of groups or the polity as a whole—in 
which case, this rationale for as-applied challenges is absent. 
The as-applied approach to the new vote denial cases creates an opportunity. To 
take advantage of it, litigants and courts will need to develop doctrine and 
precedents that clarify the weight of different kinds of burdens on the right to vote. 
Crawford opens the door to a kind of litigation that could build this future case law: 
a case law that provides more specific, and nuanced, guidance about how to weigh 
different state interests against different kinds of burdens on the individual right to 
vote. It is important that courts get this right. 
This enterprise demands a more carefully specified account of why, and in what 
way, the individual right to vote matters. It is not enough simply to state that voting 
is an individual right or a fundamental right. To distinguish more severe burdens 
from less severe ones, and to develop precedents for deciding when such burdens 
outweigh state interests, courts will need to make at least implicit use of a theory of 
vote denial: a theory that tells us in what way(s) disenfranchisement harms 
individuals. 
The project of the next Part is to offer the beginnings of such a theory. It is 
surprising in some ways that an account like the one in the next Part does not 
already exist. Individual disenfranchisement has long functioned as a basic 
conceptual paradigm from which other, more complex claims—such one-person-
one-vote claims—are derived or analogized. But individual disenfranchisement has 
also long been entangled with issues of group (especially racial) exclusion and 
subordination. In part as a result, election law scholars lack a specific theory of vote 
denial. We lack a specific theory of why the individual right to vote matters. 
III. THE SHAPE OF THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO VOTE 
The simplest reason to value the right to vote is that voting affects who wins. In 
close elections, relatively small changes to who can vote may flip the outcome. 
That gives political parties and their partisans strong incentives to legislate and 
litigate. But from the point of view of an individual voter, such outcome effects 
cannot possibly be the whole reason, or even the main reason, why one’s right to 
                                                                                                                 
implemented by the state). For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see Joshua A. Douglas, 
The Significance of the Shift Toward As-Applied Challenges in Election Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. 
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see supra note 164. 
 191. See Douglas, supra note 190, at 674–80; Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 163, at 
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vote matters. Rational choice theorists have conclusively established that any one 
voter’s chances of shifting the outcome of a large election are infinitesimal.192 
Famously, this has led such theorists to have trouble explaining why people vote at 
all.193 Judge Learned Hand prefigured the conclusions of modern rational voter 
models when he argued that “[m]y vote is one of the most unimportant acts of my 
life . . . . [F]or what after all does my single voice count among so many?”194 And 
yet he also realized that voting is not entirely reducible to influencing election 
outcomes: “Of course I know how illusory would be the belief that my vote 
determined anything; but nevertheless when I go to the polls I have a satisfaction in 
the sense that we are all engaged in a common venture.”195 This Part is not about 
the level of personal satisfaction that one might or might not feel while voting. But 
it is ultimately about the meaning of this “common venture”—and what it means 
for a person to be included in that venture or excluded from it. 
This Part does not attempt to offer a complete theory of the individual right to 
vote. Instead it defends several claims about the shape of this right: (1) it is a right 
deeply linked with equal citizenship; (2) it is necessarily an individual right; (3) it 
is a universal right of citizens; and (4) it requires a substantive, rather than merely 
formal, opportunity to cast a ballot and have that ballot counted. Although these are 
all normative claims, the main project here is interpretive. In addition to being 
justifiable from the point of view of political theory, these points all emerge from 
the story of how American law came to embrace an individual right to vote. 
The equal citizenship dimension of the right to vote helps fill in a major lacuna 
in the rational voter story. If an individual’s right to vote were basically 
“unimportant”—if, as Judge Posner put it in Crawford, “[t]he benefits of voting to 
the individual voter are elusive”196—then not only is it hard to see why anyone 
would vote, it is also hard to see why anyone would much mind being blocked 
from casting a ballot. The argument of this Part suggests a reason why even if 
outcomes are unaffected, it might still matter a great deal to some would-be voters 
to be included among those who can cast a ballot and have it counted. In so doing, 
this Part offers a foundation for the project of determining which forms of 
disenfranchisement courts should find the most troubling—that is, which deserve 
the most weight in the individual-rights-versus-state interests calculus. 
A. Inclusion and Equal Citizenship 
The right to vote is partly constitutive of what it means to be a full citizen.197 
Full citizenship requires more than the right to vote. But ever since Aristotle 
                                                                                                                 
 
 192. See RICHARD TUCK, FREE RIDING 30–62 (2008).  
 193. See, e.g., id.; DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE 
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 196. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, 
J.), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 197. See Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional 
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distinguished citizens from “aliens and slaves” by defining citizens as “[w]hoever 
is entitled to participate in an office involving deliberation or decision,”198 the right 
to participate has been central to any plausible account of who is a full citizen and 
who is not.199 As Judith Shklar persuasively argued in her Tanner Lectures on 
citizenship and inclusion, the right to vote confers, and in some ways defines, full 
citizenship: “The ballot has always been a certificate of full membership in society, 
and its value depends primarily on its capacity to confer a minimum of social 
dignity.”200 Thus to be denied the right to vote is to be something less than a full 
citizen.201 
Shklar argues that “[t]he struggle for citizenship in America has . . . been 
overwhelmingly a demand for inclusion in the polity . . . .”202 Disenfranchised 
people have sought “not just . . . the ability to promote their interests” politically, 
but the “marks of civic dignity” that inhere in counting as a full, equal citizen.203 
Shklar suggests that this is why fights over the boundaries of the franchise have 
always had such an “extremely intense” character: those excluded “were not merely 
[being] deprived of casual political privileges, they were being betrayed and 
humiliated by their fellow citizens.”204 As Martin Luther King, Jr. put it: “The 
denial of the vote not only deprives the Negro of his constitutional rights—but what 
is even worse—it degrades him as a human being.”205 
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example, some citizens selected by lot, as in parts of the ancient Athenian democratic model. 
See BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 79–93 (1997). 
 200. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 2 (1991). 
 201. In this discussion of citizenship, I will leave aside the many thicker and more 
demanding conceptions of citizenship that require elaborate social practices and/or place 
civic activities at the center of one’s life. My concern is with a more basic form of 
citizenship: full membership in a democratic polity. 
 202. SHKLAR, supra note 200, at 3. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 38.  
 205. Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech Before the Youth March for Integrated Schools 
(Apr. 18, 1959), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 21, 22 (James Melvin Washington ed., 1986). This is the key 
proposition that Gardner contests. See Gardner, supra note 19, at 444–48. Gardner is right 
that the dignitary aspect of the right to vote is not pre-political; it is not quite the same thing 
as “the inherent dignity possessed at all times by all humans.” Id. at 447. But neither is it 
simply a mechanism for producing election outcomes. The right to vote enacts a form of 
civic inclusion, defining not merely who is a “voter,” id. at 456, but who is a full citizen. 
While the dignity of full and equal citizenship is, in Gardner’s terms, “role-specific,” id. at 
454, the relevant “role” is that of “citizen”; exclusion from the role of citizen is the dignitary 
harm Shklar and King highlight. 
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A related line of argument begins with equality rather than dignity. Modern 
political theorists disagree about the full meaning of equal citizenship, but there is 
an overlapping consensus that voting is at its very core—that the right to vote is a 
“minimal condition of political equality.”206 For Iris Young, the great modern 
political theorist of democratic inclusion, the right to vote is far from sufficient for 
establishing equal citizenship—much more is required—but it is a necessary 
foundation.207 Kenneth Karst has similarly articulated a conception of equal 
citizenship that is far broader than voting, but argues that voting “is at the heart of 
the idea of equal citizenship” because it is “the preeminent symbol of participation 
in the society as a respected member.”208 Ronald Dworkin argues that the right to 
vote has a “symbolic” power: “The community confirms an individual person’s 
membership, as a free and equal citizen, by according him or her a role in collective 
decision. In contrast, it identifies an individual who is excluded from the political 
process as someone not fully respected or not fully a member.”209  
The claim that full and equal citizenship entails the right to vote can thus be 
stated in two ways: in terms of dignity and in terms of equality. These two ways of 
framing the claim are deeply intertwined. It is possible that this may be true of all 
modern rights claims that rest on conceptions of dignity. Jeremy Waldron has 
argued perceptively that the modern concept of human dignity that we invoke as a 
ground or justification for basic rights, such as the right to vote, is intertwined with 
equality: although “dignity” long separated nobles (dignitaries) from the rest of us, 
the modern concept of human dignity that grounds so much human rights discourse 
invokes these old, hierarchical dignities for a different, egalitarian purpose.210 The 
new dignity, Waldron argues, grants us all an equal, and very high, rank; it defines 
us all as equals through privileges, such as voting, of the kind that were formerly 
reserved for those with especially exalted status.211 
The argument of this Part does not require Waldron’s broad claim about the 
deep relationship between dignity and equality. A narrower claim will suffice: in 
the specific domain of voting rights, the “social dignity” of full citizenship, which 
Shklar identifies as the real value of the right to vote, is also, at the same time, a 
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form of political equality. It is a dignity inhering in the idea that my vote counts 
just as yours counts—that I am, with respect to the right to vote, your equal.212 This 
conception of the relationship between citizenship and the franchise specifies 
nothing about which offices are democratically elected: when a formerly elected 
position becomes an appointed position, we all lose our chance to vote for that 
official, but no one’s full or equal citizenship is called into question because we 
each can still vote as the equal of our fellow citizens.213 
This is in many ways a narrow and individualistic form of political equality. It 
does not exhaust the rich vein of equality arguments mined by modern voting rights 
law. More complex claims involving the political power, equal status, and 
marginalization of groups, the rules for counting and aggregating votes and 
drawing district lines, and so on, utilize a broader range of conceptions of political 
equality.214 But logically prior to these more complex questions, there is a 
foundational question of inclusion: Who is included within the circle of full and 
equal citizens that is defined by the right to cast a ballot, and who is left out? 
B. Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Right to Vote 
There are two ways one might think about the location of the boundary between 
those who have the right to vote, and are in that sense full and equal citizens, and 
those who do not and are not. On one view, which we might call the formal view, it 
is only de jure state policies of group-based exclusion that count as denials of the 
right to vote. On this view, only when a state officially disenfranchises a group of 
citizens, such as women or propertyless men, do members of that group become 
something less than full and equal citizens. The official policy is essential because, 
on this formal view, the harm members of disenfranchised groups suffer is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“When the state legislature vests the 
right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is 
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eschewing elections, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 214. See supra Part I. 
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essentially a symbolic one: a state message of official, de jure disenfranchisement 
inflicts a harm of symbolic group-based exclusion. This harm disappears when the 
formal barriers are removed. 
In contrast, from the perspective of what we might call the substantive view, 
being included as a full and equal citizen requires more than formal inclusion: it 
also requires actually being able to cast a ballot. On this view, when any individual 
citizen attempts to vote but is blocked from doing so, she is being excluded from 
the circle of full and equal citizens.215 The state may have good reasons, even 
compelling reasons, for excluding a would-be voter. Still, on this substantive view, 
in excluding her—in denying her the right to vote—the state has made her into 
something less than a full and equal citizen. The harm of being prevented from 
voting is not wholly dependent on hearing or receiving any symbolic message of 
exclusion, nor is it necessarily dependent on membership in a group. Messages of 
subordination matter, but they are not the whole story. A would-be voter could 
even be rendered something less than a full and equal citizen without her 
knowledge—for example, if election officials appear to allow her to cast a ballot, 
but as soon as her back is turned, secretly discard the ballot instead of aggregating 
it together with the others. On the substantive view, a full and equal citizen is, in 
necessary part, one who is the equal of any other citizen in terms of actually being 
able to cast a ballot and have it counted. 
The rational voter model typically assumes the formal view. In the rational voter 
model, a barrier to voting other than an outright de jure group exclusion is simply a 
“cost,” measured in time or effort or money, which a voter might decide to pay—or 
else decide not to pay and, in Judge Posner’s words, “say what the hell and not 
vote.”216 From this perspective, individuals who try to vote but fail are not 
disenfranchised: they “disfranchise themselves” by declining to pay costs, which is 
no different conceptually from simply deciding to stay home in the first place.217 
This way of thinking blurs a temporal distinction: in reality, by the time most 
would-be voters are slapped with the so-called “costs,” it is too late to pay. But for 
our purposes here, the question is whether the formal view or the substantive view 
better captures the nature of the “right to vote” that one needs in order to be a full, 
equal citizen. 
The formal view captures part of the story. De jure disenfranchisement does 
send a powerful message of exclusion and second-class citizenship. This message 
is not erased in those rare cases when someone who is officially barred from voting 
does nonetheless manage to cast a ballot (for example, a black person passing as 
white and voting successfully in a jurisdiction that bars blacks from voting, or a 
woman voting as an act of protest prior to women’s suffrage).218 In such cases, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 215. She is not merely being excluded from a narrower “office of voter.” Gardner, supra 
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 216. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 951 (7th Cir. 2007) (Posner, 
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casting a vote strikes a blow against one’s exclusion. But it does not erase that 
exclusion. The message of subordination in the official state policy, by itself, still 
matters. 
The harder and more interesting question is what happens once all the de jure 
state policies of group-based exclusion are gone. We need to know whether a 
citizen who formally enjoys the right to vote, but is nonetheless turned away for 
some reason when she attempts to exercise that right, is being excluded from the 
circle of full and equal citizens. A central claim of the remainder of this Part is that 
she is. 
If we defined the right to vote exclusively in formal terms, no burden like a 
voter identification law or a registration list purge could ever constitute 
disenfranchisement. Only de jure group-based exclusions would disenfranchise. 
But this sharp distinction between de jure exclusions and “burdens” is very difficult 
to sustain. Most vote denial, old and new, can be accurately characterized either as 
(a) imposing a “burden” on the right to vote or (b) dividing the would-be electorate 
into two groups, a group of full, first-class citizens who actually get to vote and a 
group of others who do not. For example, a poll tax imposes a literal financial 
burden. Alternately, it draws a line that excludes from full citizenship the group of 
citizens who cannot (or do not) pay. A durational residency rule imposes the 
burden of waiting a year before voting; or alternately, it excludes the group of 
citizens who have recently moved. An early registration deadline imposes a 
logistical burden on the would-be voter to register early; or alternately, it excludes 
those who have not done so. The new vote denial controversies are no different. A 
voter identification requirement imposes the burden of obtaining the required 
identification; alternately, it excludes those voters who cannot or did not do so. A 
registration list purge imposes burdens of monitoring and reregistration, or 
alternately, it excludes those who fail to reregister. 
As we shall see, many of the rules that prevented blacks from voting in the Jim 
Crow era look very little like formal, de jure group-based exclusions. They were 
rules that placed burdens on the right to vote. Thus, any accurate account of how 
the “old” vote denial disenfranchised voters entails a substantive rather than a 
formal conception of the right to vote. Such a substantive conception emerged in 
the twentieth century in American voting rights law, as that body of law embraced 
the idea that voting is a universal, individual right of citizens. 
C. Voting and Individual Citizenship 
Within the political domain Charles Taylor calls the “politics of universalism,” 
all sides agree in principle on “the equal dignity of all citizens.”219 Whatever the 
dispute, we couch our disagreements in terms that do not offend this idea of the 
equal dignity of all citizens; we “avoid[] at all costs” suggesting that we favor a 
regime of “‘first-class’ and ‘second-class citizens.’”220 Voting rights are now at the 
very center of this political domain. As Taylor points out, by the 1960s, even those 
                                                                                                                 
The Trial of Susan B. Anthony, 80 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., Oct. 2008, at 38, 38. Anthony voted 
and was later convicted. Id. 
 219. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE 
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 220. Id. at 37. 
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who fiercely opposed black voting rights nearly always “found some pretext 
consistent with universalism” on which to justify rules that would exclude blacks 
from casting ballots.221 Within the politics of universalism, the connection between 
full citizenship and the right to vote is sufficiently tight that it seems almost 
incoherent to argue that some individuals are full citizens, yet will never be 
permitted to vote.222 In other words, today, the tight connection between voting 
rights and full citizenship, obvious to Aristotle, is obvious once again. Yet for 
much of American history, this tight connection was not a part of our law. 
1. Before Universalism: The Logic of Suffrage Restriction 
The connection between voting rights and full citizenship was long occluded by 
the legal fact of birthright citizenship. Birthright citizenship meant that, for much of 
our history, white women and poor white men who were ineligible to vote were 
also unquestionably legal “citizens.” They were unable to exercise the political 
rights of first-class citizens, but birthright citizenship precluded calling them 
anything other than citizens. Slaves were noncitizens. Indeed, slaves were the very 
paradigm of what it was to be a noncitizen who was not a foreign national.223 
Birthright citizenship meant that American law had to draw one large circle around 
those who were “citizens,” and another, much smaller circle inside the first, 
defining the subset of citizens eligible to vote.224 Citizenship and voting were out of 
alignment. A basic dimension of political equality among citizens was absent. 
The journey from this place to the modern politics of universalism, which 
restored the tight connection between voting and individual citizenship, took more 
than a century, from Reconstruction until roughly 1975. This subpart will not 
retrace that entire arc, but will make a claim about its trajectory: American law 
followed an individualistic path to a brand of universalism that connects individual 
citizenship with the right to vote. From the point of view of normative political 
theory, this was the right path. The alternatives were seriously inadequate. 
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Let us briefly consider where things stood at the start of this journey. At the time 
of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the conceptual connection between 
citizenship and the right to vote was far too weak to bear any weight. This 
weakness came into sharp relief shortly after the Amendment’s passage, when 
Virginia Minor brought her historic lawsuit demanding the right to vote.225 The 
Fourteenth Amendment had expressly defined United States citizens as “[a]ll 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof” and protected such citizens’ “privileges or immunities.”226 And so the 
Court agreed that on the Amendment’s definition—which tracked pre-existing 
definitions—Minor was obviously a “citizen.”227 The Court was not inclined to 
enfranchise women in 1874, and so it famously held that voting was not one of the 
privileges or immunities of citizenship.228 To justify this holding, the Court had to 
define the political meaning of “citizen” in a way that did not entail a right to 
vote.229 Awkwardly, it did so. It defined citizenship in terms of the “reciprocal 
obligations” of “allegiance and protection” between the individual and the state.230 
This definition had a glaring and somewhat embarrassing flaw: it was just as 
applicable to “subjects” as it was to “citizens.” Even medieval serfs were bound to 
their lords by demands for allegiance in exchange for protection. The Court, to its 
credit, noticed this problem. But its attempt to work around the problem involved 
digging deeper into the hole. At the bottom, the Court offered a remarkably frank 
admission that it had drained away any real difference between what it is to be a 
citizen and what it is to be a subject or a serf.231 The Court stated that “the words 
‘subject,’ ‘inhabitant,’ and ‘citizen’” were all just different names for 
“membership” in a nation, words adopted “[f]or convenience.”232 “Citizen” was the 
word that “is now more commonly employed . . . [and] it has been considered 
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better suited to the description of one living under a republican government.”233 On 
this account, a “citizen” is just an inhabitant or subject who happens to be fortunate 
enough to reside in a republic. That is, you are a citizen if you inhabit the kind of 
place where some of the people have the right to participate in the offices involving 
deliberation and decision—even if you yourself have no such right. 
Minor’s remarkably weak argument about voting and citizenship was by no 
means unique, nor was it new in the post-Reconstruction period.234 Its weakness 
revealed a longstanding instability and tension between the fact of birthright 
citizenship and the fact that most “citizens,” from women to non-property-owning 
white men, were disenfranchised. The only way for the Court to ease this tension 
was to use a hollowed-out conception of “citizen” that ignored the actual practices, 
especially voting, that are constitutive of what it means, politically, to be a citizen. 
This hollowed-out conception of the meaning of citizenship settled the matter for 
the Court. But it never completely erased from the public mind a different, thicker, 
and older idea of citizenship in a democratic state, in which full citizenship entails a 
right to vote. Subsequent movements seeking the right to vote were thus able to 
make claims on this thicker idea of citizenship in demanding both formal and 
substantive enfranchisement on the ground that as “citizens,” they had a right to 
vote as the equal of any other citizen. 
This took time. In the immediate post-Reconstruction period, the politics of 
voting rights was not yet a politics of universalism. State governments retained 
extensive powers after the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment to make explicit 
distinctions (on any basis other than race and color) between first-class, voting 
citizens and the broader category of second-class citizens ineligible to vote. As 
Alexander Keyssar has shown, by blocking laws that disenfranchised blacks on the 
basis of race, but only such laws, the Fifteenth Amendment had the indirect effect 
of encouraging election “reformers” intent on disenfranchising blacks to build up 
restrictions of other kinds, particularly those based on property and education.235 
Such restrictions also targeted whites who were poor, who were immigrants, or 
who were otherwise viewed, in the words of one former Alabama governor, as 
“ignorant, incompetent, and vicious.”236 As Reconstruction faded, reformers and 
redeemers in both the South and the North introduced literacy tests, property 
qualifications, poll taxes, “pauper” restrictions, and “complex, cumbersome 
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registration procedures”237 that had the purpose and effect of limiting the set of 
first-class, voting citizens to a smaller subset238 of all citizens.239 
In order to enact these restrictions, reformers relied constantly on the claim that 
there was no necessary link between individual citizenship and the vote. To support 
this claim, they often framed the purpose of voting and elections in an entirely 
instrumental, structural way: the aim was election outcomes. For example, Francis 
Parkman, a prominent opponent of universal suffrage, argued in an influential 1878 
article against what he called the “superstition” involved in arguments for the 
individual right to vote.240 He argued that voting rights advocates “confound” the 
means and the ends: “Good government is the end, and the ballot is worthless 
except so far as it helps to reach this end. Any reasonable man would willingly 
renounce his privilege of dropping a piece of paper into a box, provided that good 
government were assured to him and his descendants.”241 This kind of argument 
differs from the modern rational voter view (in which voting is about achieving 
outcomes one prefers, rather than “good government”). But the arguments lead to a 
similar place: if outcomes are all that matter, then the individual right to vote has 
no independent value. Arguments such as Parkman’s provided a philosophical 
foundation for the wave of restrictions on urban, working class, often immigrant 
voters whom restrictionist reformers argued were voting illegally, irresponsibly, 
and for outcomes that did not serve the public interest.242 These restrictions were 
hot partisan battlegrounds in the North, pitting Republican reformers intent on 
cracking down on fraud and protecting the “purity” of the ballot box against 
Democrats intent on protecting the votes of their urban immigrant supporters.243  
Some of those arguments continue today in only slightly modified form. But 
others sound in a register that is unfamiliar to us because it predates our modern 
politics of universalism and its premise of equal citizenship. In the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries it was perfectly within the bounds of ordinary 
political discourse to argue that some citizens were too ignorant, incompetent, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 237. KEYSSAR, supra note 235, at 129. See generally KOUSSER, supra note 236. 
 238. In the Reconstruction era, some noncitizens also had the vote. Alien “declarant” 
voting, in which noncitizens could vote upon declaring their intent to naturalize, was 
common during this period, but states almost universally eliminated it as part of the new 
wave of restrictions on the franchise between the 1890s and 1920s. See KEYSSAR, supra note 
235, at 371–73 tbl.A.12. This arguably had the effect of tying voting more closely to 
citizenship. Since this period, the prohibitions on noncitizen voting in federal elections have 
since hardened considerably. See infra notes 284–85 and accompanying text. 
 239. See KEYSSAR, supra note 235, at 128–36; FRANCES FOX PIVEN, LORRAINE C. 
MINNITE & MARGARET GROARKE, KEEPING DOWN THE BLACK VOTE: RACE AND THE 
DEMOBILIZATION OF AMERICAN VOTERS 31 (2009). For example, by the mid-1920s, thirteen 
states outside the South were disenfranchising illiterate citizens who met all other 
requirements. KEYSSAR, supra note 235, at 145 & tbl.A.13. 
 240. KEYSSAR, supra note 235, at 124 (quoting Francis Parkman, The Failure of 
Universal Suffrage, 127 N. AM. REV. 1, 10 (1878)). 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at 123–24. 
 243. Id. at 153–56; see also Dayna L. Cunningham, Who Are to Be the Electors? A 
Reflection on the History of Voter Registration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
370, 380–88 (1991). 
2011] EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 1343 
 
corruptible, racially inferior, or poor to deserve the voting rights of full, first-class 
citizens.244 Notably, even some arguments for extending the franchise took the form 
of claims that certain citizens should be recognized as the betters of others. Some 
suffragists argued for women’s right to vote essentially on the grounds that it was 
an affront to the social standing of “educated, patriotic women” to be 
disenfranchised while many men who were less deserving of the right to vote 
nonetheless enjoyed it.245 
But among the arguments for women’s suffrage a different, more universalist 
line of argument emerged: the claim that, contra Minor, each adult citizen was 
entitled—in virtue of being a citizen—to vote. Broadly speaking, the story of 
voting rights in the twentieth century is the story of the triumph of this line of 
argument. It ushered in our modern politics of universalism and equal citizenship 
with regard to the right to vote. The Nineteenth Amendment was a crucial step 
along this path because it linked the right to vote much more closely with 
individual citizenship. 
2. The Nineteenth Amendment and Individual Citizenship 
Opponents of women’s suffrage long relied on the premise that there was no 
necessary connection between citizenship and voting. These opponents argued that 
although women were citizens—as they must be, given birthright citizenship—
women were nonetheless best represented in the political sphere through the votes 
of male heads of household.246 This argument amounted to a claim that voting 
rights accrued to household units rather than individuals (and that men would speak 
for the household units). As one Congressman argued in 1868: “[I]t is necessary 
that every citizen may either exercise the right of suffrage himself, or have it 
exercised for his benefit by some one who by reason of domestic or social relations 
with him can be fairly said to represent his interests.”247 Actual representation 
would go to households; many individuals would have only virtual representation. 
The “revolutionary core” of the project of women’s suffrage was the claim that 
the state was composed not of households but of individual citizens.248 As full and 
equal individual citizens, women deserved the right to vote. Elizabeth Cady Stanton 
argued forcefully for “our republican idea, individual citizenship.”249 The overall 
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aim of the women’s suffrage movement is best understood in terms of ending 
women’s (group) subordination.250 But because of the distinctive shape of women’s 
subordination in the domain of voting—the state’s insistence on enfranchising 
households rather than individuals—“individual citizenship” was the basic reform 
suffragists sought. 
The argument that individual women were equal citizens, and, as such, had an 
equal right to vote, shook the conceptual foundations of voting and citizenship in 
the United States. It replaced the idea that elections merely needed to represent 
interests with the more individualistic idea that each citizen has a right to vote.251 
The Nineteenth Amendment thus not only overturned the outcome in Minor but 
also repudiated crucial parts of the logic of Minor. Specifically, it overturned the 
hollow conception of the political meaning of citizenship at the heart of Minor—
the proposition that while “citizens” might have some civil rights, in terms of 
politics they are nothing more than subjects who happen to reside in a republic. In 
light of the repudiation of this central pillar of its reasoning in addition to its result, 
Minor is best read today as an anticanonical case.252 It stands for a disjunction 
between voting and individual citizenship that our constitutional order has since 
repaired. 
The Nineteenth Amendment extended and arguably completed one of the great 
projects that the American Revolution began: replacing systems of virtual 
representation with systems of actual self-government.253 The colonists’ lack of 
actual representation in the British Parliament was so total that it was incompatible 
with a variety of conceptions of self-government, not all of them particularly 
individualistic. But by reaching into the family and defining its adult members as 
citizens with independent voting rights, the Nineteenth Amendment, along with the 
Reconstruction Amendments, channeled this anti-virtual-representation strain of 
the ideology of the Revolution in a distinctively individualistic direction. In light of 
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the success of the movement for women’s suffrage, individual citizenship was 
linked much more closely to an individual right to vote. But the transition was 
incomplete: until the 1960s and early 1970s states continued to circumscribe the 
boundaries of first-class voting citizenship in numerous ways. It was in dismantling 
these limits that American law gave the individual right to vote its full modern 
meaning. 
D. A Substantive, Universal Right of Citizens 
In the brief period from the early 1960s through 1975, American voting rights 
law underwent a revolution. The main story of this revolution is the familiar story 
of black enfranchisement: the litigation, legislation, and social movement activism 
that led ultimately to the dismantling of the Jim Crow restrictions on black voting 
rights, fulfilling the Fifteenth Amendment’s promise. But that is not where the 
story ends. Rather than simply dismantling race discrimination in voting, American 
law took a dramatic universalist turn, sweeping away almost all the bases of 
suffrage restriction that remained in 1960 and establishing a nationwide norm of 
universal adult suffrage tied closely to individual citizenship. This universalist turn 
was the product of both litigation and legislation, and it was codified both in 
statutes and in constitutional doctrine. This subpart will not tell its entire story, but 
will make some observations about what the events of this period mean for the 
philosophical foundations of our voting rights regime. 
First, the voting restrictions that fell during this period were not de jure race-
based restrictions on suffrage but rules that, for a series of reasons, had the 
substantive effect of blocking blacks and others from casting ballots. The changes 
that took place in this period thus established unmistakably that democratic 
inclusion requires more than an end to the official, de jure exclusion of one’s group 
from the polity. Full and equal citizenship requires actually being able to cast a 
ballot—a substantive, rather than merely formal, right to vote.  
Second, the universalist turn in this period established that in addition to 
protections against group-based discrimination in voting, our law now correctly 
conceives of voting as a universal fundamental right of citizens. The wrongness of 
disenfranchisement is not simply the wrongness of race discrimination or other 
similar group-based exclusion: it is also a violation of a fundamental right of 
citizens. 
The exclusions that fell in the early part of this period were typically of a kind 
that “falsely ascribed personal deficiencies”254 to voters and then denied them the 
vote based on those deficiencies, so that many citizens had the franchise in theory 
but lacked it in practice. As Brian Landsberg vividly describes in his recent account 
of early voting rights litigation in Alabama, these barriers turned the act of filling 
out a registration form into a complex and discriminatory test of civic competence 
that many did not pass.255 One black citizen told Landsberg, who was at that time a 
DOJ voting section lawyer, that he had applied three times to register to vote and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 254. SHKLAR, supra note 200, at 38. 
 255. BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, FREE AT LAST TO VOTE: THE ALABAMA ORIGINS OF THE 1965 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT (2007). 
1346 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1289 
 
“had never heard whether his applications had been accepted or not, but he figured 
he had failed the ‘test’ somehow.”256 “[R]ejected black applicants for registration,” 
Landsberg writes, “routinely explained to me that they had not been victims of 
discrimination; they had simply ‘failed’ the registration process in some way.”257 
Barriers of this kind differed from pre-Fifteenth Amendment de jure restrictions on 
black voting. The new restrictions conveyed a more individualized message of 
personal inadequacy and failure that purported to justify each voter’s individual 
exclusion from first-class, voting citizenship. States sometimes described their 
suffrage-restricting tests as “citizenship” tests, making it as clear as possible that 
they were calling into question the full citizenship of those who failed the tests, on 
an individualized voter-by-voter basis.258  
These voter-by-voter methods certainly conveyed a message of group 
subordination as well as individual inadequacy, but they did not block every black 
voter.259 From a narrow economic perspective, these methods imposed enormous 
and unfair “costs” on black would-be voters, but some did manage to pay those 
costs and vote. This voter-by-voter disenfranchisement worked in multiple stages: 
blacks who did register were often later removed from the rolls through list 
maintenance practices, such as purging the names of those who had moved or died, 
that registrars conducted in discriminatory ways.260 While the continuities between 
these old vote denial controversies and today’s new vote denial controversies 
should not be overstated, almost all of the legal domains where the new 
controversies take place, from registration requirements to list purges to challengers 
inside the polls, are among the domains where these old battles were fought. This is 
no accident: action in these domains is what determines whether a formal right to 
vote becomes a substantive right to vote. 
Early litigation against Jim Crow jurisdictions focused on voting rules that 
provided registrars with wide discretion, which they exercised in discriminatory 
ways, or on voting rules that had the effect of “freezing” past discrimination against 
blacks.261 However, as voting rights litigation and legislation took shape between 
the early 1960s and 1975, it expanded beyond this initial focus on black voting 
rights. It ultimately had a far broader and more universal impact: it rendered the 
right to vote a universal right of citizens. The story of why this occurred is 
complex. Part of the story is that as the civil rights movement’s efforts to expand 
black voting rights gained momentum, those efforts became intertwined with the 
continuing efforts of other, quite different movements to expand the circle of first-
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class, voting citizens. Advocates of black voting rights found themselves in a 
fraught and uneasy alliance with advocates of the old New Deal agenda of 
enfranchising poor white voters by eliminating the poll tax, that bastion of 
conservative Southern power (“Polltaxia”) that President Roosevelt had tried and 
failed to dismantle.262 Eliminating the poll tax was also a major part of the 
unfinished business of the women’s suffrage movement, which had been working 
since the 1920s to dismantle a barrier that disproportionately disenfranchised 
women.263 A synthesis of these agendas led to the 24th Amendment banning poll 
taxes in federal elections264 and to the unusual provisions of the VRA of 1965 
authorizing DOJ litigation to invalidate poll taxes in state elections.265  
The VRA itself became radically more universal in sweep as it was amended in 
1970 and 1975.266 First temporarily in 1970, and then permanently in 1975, 
Congress put into place a nationwide statutory ban on denying any citizen the right 
to vote in any federal, state, or local election “because of his failure to comply with 
any test or device . . . .”267 This ban expanded the much more targeted ban in the 
original 1965 Act, which had temporarily barred such practices only in the mostly 
Southern jurisdictions covered by section 5.268 The change “removed the regional 
stigma”; it allowed voting rights proponents to move away from talk of Southern 
racial hierarchy and toward a focus on the idea that each citizen has a fundamental 
right to vote.269 
The Court acted in tandem with these legislative developments to steer voting 
rights law firmly in a universalist direction, pressing far beyond race 
discrimination. When the Court invalidated poll taxes in 1966, it did so not on the 
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basis of race but on the ground that “the right to vote is too precious, too 
fundamental to be . . . burdened or conditioned” by “wealth or fee paying.”270 This 
choice was especially notable because in point of fact the evidence was 
overwhelming that the particular poll tax at issue in the case had been enacted with 
racially invidious motives; yet the Court bypassed the race-based antidiscrimination 
route entirely in favor of a more universalist holding.271 In quick succession the 
Court then granted relief to a series of citizen plaintiffs asserting their right to vote 
in the face of restrictions that had very little to do with the problem of black 
disenfranchisement—or with any analogous group-based exclusion. The Court 
struck down laws restricting bond elections to property holders272 and school board 
elections to parents (and property holders);273 it also struck down laws preventing 
members of the military from establishing residency for purposes of voting.274 
Together the Court and Congress enfranchised eighteen-year-olds275 and radically 
cut back on the ability of states to impose residency requirements.276 As Alexander 
Keyssar notes, “What occurred in the course of a decade was not only the 
reenfranchisement of African Americans but the abolition of nearly all remaining 
limits on the right to vote.”277 Congress and the Court moved “from a focus on 
black enfranchisement to an embrace of universal suffrage.”278 Rather than (only) 
extending the group-based protections against racial discrimination in voting to 
cover additional groups, both Congress and the Court embraced the idea that voting 
is a fundamental right of each individual citizen. The Court held that all restrictions 
on voting, not just those that disenfranchise a protected group, “must be carefully 
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scrutinized by the Court to determine whether each resident citizen has, as far as is 
possible, an equal voice.”279 
This universalist turn linked the right to vote firmly to individual citizenship. 
For the first two centuries of American political development, the question of 
whom to treat as first-class, voting citizens had been a policy question states might 
decide on the basis of any number of considerations, including the kind of election 
outcomes that a given line between the voters and the nonvoters could reasonably 
be expected to produce. That view was the Court’s view as late as 1959, when even 
some justices who thought poll taxes were unconstitutional nonetheless voted to 
uphold a literacy test on the ground that it could promote “intelligent use of the 
ballot.”280 But in the turn toward the politics of universalism, something changed: 
voting became a fundamental right of citizens, closely tied to citizenship itself, that 
could only be denied or abridged by the state with compelling reason. Instead of 
enumerating grounds on which the right to vote must not be denied, the Court 
began to list the only permissible qualifications for voting that remained, and it was 
a short list—age, citizenship, and residency281—the same three qualifications that 
the Court later held to be the only permissible qualifications for federal 
officeholders.282 At the same time, states’ latitude in imposing both age- and 
residency-based voting restrictions was seriously circumscribed.283 The “age, 
citizenship, residency” formula does not mention the most significant remaining 
exception to universalism: most states retain a category of nonvoting citizens 
consisting of felons and usually at least some ex-felons. But leaving aside that 
notable exception, the basic conceptual link between citizenship and voting is now 
firmly established in our law. The only area in which the right to vote has become 
substantially more restricted over the course of this transition to universalism is, 
instructively, citizenship status: it is now a federal crime for noncitizens to vote in 
federal elections.284 States and localities are permitted to allow noncitizens to vote 
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in state and local elections, and some localities have done so; one way to 
understand this phenomenon is to view these localities as, in effect, rendering some 
residents local citizens even though they are not U.S. citizens.285 
In theory, it might have been logically possible to enfranchise blacks without 
working such a fundamental change in the American conception of the relationship 
between voting and citizenship. But it seems very implausible that history would 
have taken such a course. The arguments for black enfranchisement thoroughly 
dismantled the logic of suffrage restriction that made sense to jurists at the time of 
Minor. Enfranchising blacks, especially in the South, entailed enfranchising poor 
citizens and illiterate citizens. This required much more than removing explicit 
barriers such as pauper exclusions, literacy tests, and poll taxes. In order to 
transform the right to vote from a formal, theoretical guarantee into a substantive 
entitlement of citizenship, it was necessary to dismantle the whole apparatus of 
Byzantine registration processes, test-like forms, and “vouching” rules that did the 
work of distinguishing the inner circle of first-class citizens who could actually 
vote from the larger set of other citizens whose right to vote was merely notional. 
All the clever local processes of ascribing personal failings and deficiencies to 
voters and then judging them to be less-than-first-class citizens on the basis of 
those deficiencies were called into question by the revolutionary claim that blacks 
deserved not only a theoretical, on-the-books right to vote but also an actual, 
substantive opportunity in every election to cast a ballot and have it counted. 
This new foundation for the right to vote brought the law into alignment with a 
modern democratic conception of individual citizenship. Even Justice Harlan, in his 
dissent from the decision invalidating the poll tax, agreed with the proposition that 
“[p]roperty and poll-tax qualifications, very simply, are not in accord with current 
egalitarian notions of how a modern democracy should be organized.”286 Women’s 
suffrage and black enfranchisement were assimilated into the deep structure of 
American election law in part by being transformed into something more abstract, 
less group-oriented, and more individualistic. This transformation was only partial. 
American law continues to provide minority groups with powerful protections 
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against group-based harm.287 But by bringing voting and citizenship back into 
alignment, these movements essentially eliminated the conceptual category of 
second-class, nonvoting citizens; courts and political actors therefore came to treat 
voting as a fundamental individual right of each citizen, regardless of membership 
in any group. President Ford, in his remarks as he signed the crucial 1975 extension 
of the VRA that made permanent the nationwide ban on literacy tests and other 
devices,288 notably eschewed all references to blacks, Jim Crow, or civil rights. He 
told a simpler story: “The right to vote is at the very foundation of our American 
system . . . . There must be no question whatsoever about the right of each eligible 
American, each eligible citizen to participate in our elective process.”289 
This individualistic aspect of the right to vote does not exhaust modern voting 
rights law. The movements for democratic inclusion that began with struggles to 
enfranchise women, blacks, and the poor have left us with a pluralistic legal 
regime. One layer of the law—the layer that is the main subject of this Article—
protects individual citizens’ right to vote without any regard for group membership. 
A separate layer of the law protects racial and language minority groups against 
group-based harm. The Fourteenth Amendment and VRA both operate in each of 
these layers. When the Court established that voting is a fundamental right as well 
as a domain for group-based equal protection, or when President Ford framed the 
VRA extension as a matter of protecting the rights of “each eligible citizen,” these 
interpreters, among others, were establishing the first, more individualistic layer of 
voting rights law as we know it today. This layer of the law establishes a floor of 
individual inclusion: before resolving any questions of group disadvantage, our law 
ensures that each individual citizen has the right to vote. 
E. Marginalized Citizens and the Fundamental Right to Vote 
Democratic inclusion is much larger than voting.290 Iris Young argued that 
“[s]ome of the most powerful and successful social movements of this century have 
mobilized around demands for oppressed and marginalized people to be included as 
full and equal citizens in their polities.”291 Those movements were not exclusively 
about the right to vote. They were not even exclusively about politics. But the right 
to vote is a foundation for the kind of inclusion that these movements seek. It 
should not surprise us that Tennessee v. Lane repeatedly and extensively discussed 
voting rights even though it was not a voting case—it was a case about Congress’s 
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power to promote the inclusion and equal citizenship of people with disabilities by 
protecting their fundamental rights to access courthouses and other government 
services.292 Justice Ginsburg correctly observed that the statute at issue in Lane, 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), “is a measure expected to 
advance equal-citizenship stature for persons with disabilities.”293 If it is to 
accomplish that end, then whatever else it does, it must protect a substantive right 
to vote. 
In the years since Congress and the courts embraced a politics of universalism 
with regard to the right to vote, a series of marginalized groups—language 
minorities, people with disabilities, and homeless people, among others—have used 
the doctrinal and conceptual tools from the universalist turn of the 1960s and 1970s 
to press their own demands for the dignity of full political inclusion. Language 
minorities advanced their claims through the 1975 and 1982 VRA Amendments.294 
Disabled voters won a series of legislative provisions in the Voting Accessibility 
for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984295 and the National Voter Registration 
Act of 1993296 aimed at making both registration processes and polling places more 
accessible and enabling voters who need assistance to receive it.297 
Homeless voters won some court victories in the 1980s, as state and federal 
courts held that the Equal Protection Clause—as read through the key precedents 
from the universalist turn—protected homeless voters.298 Regulations pursuant to 
the National Voter Registration Act then put in place a national procedure through 
which an individual registering to vote is permitted to indicate and describe a “non-
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traditional residence.”299 Homeless voters face continuing barriers: some find 
themselves purged from the rolls every election cycle because they lack a valid 
mailing address, and some have no way to satisfy identification requirements.300 In 
addition, as two advocates for the homeless explain, “[m]arginalized people have 
so often experienced systematic disenfranchisement” in various areas of life that 
they often do not believe they are entitled to vote.301 Thus “[t]he misconception that 
voting is not allowed among homeless persons continues to prevail.”302 
Because the right to vote is a central mechanism of democratic inclusion, it is 
particularly important to protect the right to vote of citizens who are already 
marginalized—treated as less than full and equal citizens—in other domains of 
political and social life. Such citizens may be less likely to be able to pursue other 
avenues of participation in politics or the public sphere. For example, compared to 
other citizens, they may not have the resources to contribute to political campaigns 
or to engage in persuasive forms of speech. Their marginalization may also mean 
that others do not listen to their speech. When other paths by which we might 
contribute to political and public life are closed off, the bare civic minimum—the 
vote—takes on a greater importance. The significance of the vote as a mark of civic 
inclusion is greatest for those whose inclusion might otherwise be in doubt. 
Thus, for example, it is particularly important to protect the voting rights of 
citizens with mental disabilities. Advocates for such individuals began arguing in 
the 1970s that voting could be a “therapeutic and normalizing experience”303 
because “[i]n the United States, the legal right to vote symbolizes that you are a 
first-class citizen.”304 Today, unlike physical disability, “mental incapacity” 
remains a ground on which federal law expressly permits states to remove citizens 
from the rolls.305 This is not always a bad thing: the key line to be drawn is whether 
an individual is able to form a conscious intention to vote.306 (It does not advance 
the aim of inclusion to give ballots to people who “do not understand the nature of 
voting” and therefore constitute “a pool of potential votes that might be cast by 
anyone with the ability to gain access to those individuals’ ballots.”)307 However, 
states do not always draw the line this way. While state laws vary, and in general 
have improved greatly from the automatic disqualifications of “idiots” of the 
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past,308 some states still automatically disenfranchise all adults who are under 
guardianship, rather than engaging in the necessary substantive inquiry into 
whether a given adult might, for example, be able to cast a vote even if he cannot 
manage his financial affairs.309 Moreover, vast numbers of citizens with mental 
disabilities who are not under guardianship require accommodations or assistance 
to vote.310 
These barriers to participation matter because, as the struggle for black 
enfranchisement demonstrated so conclusively, de jure barriers to voting are not the 
only way to exclude someone from the circle of full and equal citizens. Inclusion 
comes about when the procedures and requirements for voting are set up in such a 
way that the individual voter can actually cast her vote and have it count. This aim 
continues to require legislative action, but courts play an essential role as well. 
F. Preservative of All Rights? 
The Court has long emphasized that the right to vote is a “fundamental political 
right” because it is “preservative of all rights.”311 But in what sense is the right to 
vote “preservative” of other rights? We typically understand the preservative 
mechanism to be political power: with the right to vote, individuals and groups can 
protect their other rights through normal politics. That argument is weak. As Owen 
Fiss has noted, as a practical matter the right to vote is not “preservative of all 
rights” and “[s]ometimes . . . is not even preservative of itself, as emphasized in the 
post-Reconstruction wave of disenfranchisement.”312 Voting rights alone are 
insufficient to protect marginalized groups from the political will of a hostile 
majority. 
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Perhaps this “preservative” claim, in its original early nineteenth century 
incarnation, is a leftover shard of a different argument that is harder for us to access 
today because we now have an overly outcome-focused, rational choice-inflected 
perspective on what the right to vote is about. In many state constitutional debates 
in the early nineteenth century, the vote was “so important” to poor, landless white 
men precisely because “it meant that they were citizens, unlike women and slaves, 
as they repeated over and over again. Their very identity as free males was at 
stake.”313 As one speaker in these debates put it, the right of suffrage should not be 
understood in “its technical and confined sense, the right to vote for public 
functionaries” and elect candidates to office, but in a different and more conceptual 
sense: “Suffrage is the substratum, the paramount right” upon which the other 
rights of free citizens rest.314 This formulation suggests that perhaps it was a bit of 
an anachronism to read “preservative of all rights” exclusively as a theory about 
political power. Perhaps instead the original idea was, at least in part, that “other 
rights” depended on a “substratum” of citizenship;315 the right to vote was 
“fundamental” because it made citizenship real. 
This Part has offered the beginning of an account of why the right to vote is 
fundamental: a story of democratic inclusion. This story departs radically from 
conceptions of the value of the right to vote that are rooted in rational choice 
models of one’s impact on an election outcome. That is part of what recommends 
this framework. The democratic inclusion story helps us see why some fight hard 
for their right to vote even though outcome-focused rational choice analysis 
inevitably concludes that an individual vote has little value.316 On the flip side, the 
democratic inclusion story may also suggest at least two explanations for why some 
eligible voters do not vote. Some people who are confident in their full citizenship, 
and know their right to vote is entirely secure and unquestioned, may feel no 
particular need to exercise it. Having the right is what does the work of inclusion.317 
In contrast, other people may “have so often experienced systematic 
disenfranchisement” in various areas of life that they do not believe they are 
entitled to vote at all.318 
When courts are not inclined to credit a plaintiff’s complaint of exclusion, they 
tend to fall back, as Judge Posner did in Crawford, on the view that the 
disenfranchisement was due to the would-be voter’s own negligence: such citizens 
“disfranchise themselves.”319 It may be inevitable that when voters try and fail to 
vote because of some interaction between their individual circumstances and the 
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actions of the state, courts look for something like comparative fault. It seems 
relevant to the issue of the severity of the burden: the easier it would have been for 
a voter to overcome a burden, the less severe the burden looks in retrospect. 
But this kind of backward-looking inquiry can lead the analysis astray. It is 
important to recall that many of the barriers to voting that were dismantled in the 
great turn toward universalism of the 1960s and 1970s were not de jure barriers, but 
barriers that worked by “falsely ascrib[ing] personal deficiencies” to voters in order 
to justify their exclusion.320 If we pick apart the chain of events that led to a would-
be voter’s exclusion there is almost always something that the voter could have 
done differently. He could have stood in the correct line. He could have read the 
newspaper and found out that his address had been reassigned to a new polling 
place. He could have sent away for a birth certificate and then sought a non-driver’s 
identification card from the state. He could have reregistered after having been 
purged from the rolls. He could have made the decision to vote months ago, instead 
of tuning in to the election shortly before election day and suddenly deciding to 
vote. And so on. Identifying these deficiencies in the voter’s prior actions and 
choices does not necessarily mitigate the dignitary harm of exclusion from the 
circle of first-class, voting citizens. Indeed, particularly for a would-be voter whose 
full citizenship is already in question in other areas of his life, imputing fault may 
only underscore the implication that while some other people have earned the 
substantive right to vote, he has not. 
Thus, when an eligible voter appears and tries to vote on an equal basis with his 
neighbors, the state should have to provide an adequate reason for refusing to let 
him do so—even if, at some earlier stage, there was something the voter could have 
done differently. There is no reason to privilege exclusively a distant ex ante 
perspective over the perspective of the would-be voter at the time she is trying to 
vote. Even if there is something the would-be voter could have done differently at 
some earlier stage, here he is now, asking to be included as a full citizen in the 
polity. If there is nothing he can do now that would cause the state to allow him to 
vote, that outcome may well be justified, but this burden on his right to full 
inclusion is significant enough that the state ought to offer a countervailing interest 
sufficient to justify not offering him any route by which he can vote.321 
G. Weighing the Burdens 
In the next few years, in the wake of Crawford, courts will face a series of 
questions about how to weigh the severity of different burdens on the right to vote 
against competing structural interests. Courts will need to develop new precedents 
over time to shape these inquiries. The argument of this Part cannot anticipate all 
the issues that will arise as courts develop those precedents. Still, the argument of 
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this Part has some significant implications for which questions ought to be at the 
heart of this future jurisprudence. 
The weight a court ought to ascribe to a particular burden on the right to vote 
depends on both its “character” and its “magnitude.”322 Magnitude is relatively 
straightforward: How difficult does the burden in question make it for the plaintiff 
to vote?323 As Part II argued, the proper way to think about this question is in terms 
of the magnitude of the burden on particular voters—preferably, the plaintiffs—
rather than a general assessment of the number of individuals who will be affected. 
The “character” of the burden is equally important. That is the aspect of the 
analysis that the argument of this Part helps illuminate. 
Different conceptions of why the right to vote matters yield starkly different 
accounts of which burdens on the right to vote are “severe” in character. If the right 
to vote mattered only as part of the playing field of political competition among 
candidates and parties, then it might make sense to narrow the initial inquiry to 
questions of whether particular challenged laws were passed with the intent or 
effect of making that partisan playing field uneven. If the right to vote were entirely 
about election outcomes, then disenfranchisement would only be a concern to the 
extent that it was outcome altering. But if, as this Part has argued, the right to vote 
matters because of its deep links to equal citizenship and inclusion, then neither of 
those threshold questions is appropriate. Instead, all disenfranchisement matters. 
But burdens that have the character of denying or calling into question individual 
voters’ equal citizenship ought to weigh especially heavily on the individual-rights-
versus-state-interests balancing test. 
Thus, courts ought to weigh especially heavily those practices that, like the 
problematic “citizenship” tests of an earlier era, call eligible voters’ full citizenship 
into question on election day. This category includes, for example, challengers 
inside the polls who publicly question individual voters’ eligibility and voter 
registration rules that cause some eligible voters to be turned away on election day, 
unable to cast ballots. 
From the point of view of equal citizenship, courts also ought to weigh 
especially heavily those burdens that are linked to something about a voter that 
might cause her to be treated as less than a full citizen in other areas of political and 
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social life—for example, that she is homeless, or has a disability, or is old, or 
young, or poor. The idea here is still to protect the individual plaintiffs, not to 
introduce a threshold inquiry of whether a group’s interests have been harmed. 
Indeed, a focus on group interests may sometimes make the individual claim 
invisible. For example, suppose a polity chooses voting regime A (say, touch 
screen machines) over voting regime B (say, optical scan), and for the majority of 
voters with disabilities, A was indeed the best choice. Nonetheless, if an individual 
voter cannot vote under regime A for reasons linked with her disability, a court 
ought to weigh her disenfranchisement relatively heavily and create or expand an 
alternative path toward casting a ballot unless some relevant state interest weighs 
very heavily in the other direction. If the meaning of the right to vote is in part that 
it makes full citizenship real, then courts ought to weigh heavily any burdens that 
instead reinforce the contrary proposition that because a person has a disability she 
is something less than a full, equal citizen. 
The right to participate is multi-layered. One layer is simply objective: Was a 
voter able to cast a ballot and have it counted? But the subjective experience of 
disenfranchisement also matters. Imagine three different scenarios. First, a machine 
tabulation problem prevents a small number of randomly-selected ballots from 
being counted. The voters never find out. Second, a poor ballot design creates a 
trap for the unwary: it causes some ballots, the same number as in the first scenario, 
to go uncounted, and they tend to be the ballots of voters who are less educated 
and/or less literate than other voters. Again, those whose ballots are invalidated 
never find out. Third, imagine a case in which the problem is with the registration 
system rather than the ballot. Here, the same voters as in the second scenario are 
blocked from voting, but the experience of it is different. Instead of walking away 
thinking that they had cast a ballot, they reach the front of the line at the polling 
place, discover that they are not in fact registered, and are turned away.324 
Each of these three scenarios involves burdens on the individual right to vote. 
The magnitude of the burdens is similar: in each case, the voters were prevented 
from casting ballots. (While in scenarios two and three there is more that a voter 
might have done, ex ante, to avoid disenfranchisement, let us assume that the 
disenfranchised voters were not capable of doing what was required.) However, the 
character of the burdens is different. In the first and second scenarios, the voters 
were objectively disenfranchised but experienced no subjective injury. In the first 
scenario, there also was no relationship, no correlation or causal link, between the 
disenfranchisement and any characteristics or group memberships of the voters. 
Those disenfranchised by the tabulation error were not particularly marginalized 
voters; they were just random individuals. The disenfranchisement involved in the 
first scenario should therefore not strike courts as being of a particularly serious 
character. A court might therefore find, for example, that the expense involved in 
replacing these voting machines was sufficient to justify the state’s decision to 
retain them despite occasional problems of the type involved in the first scenario. 
The second scenario is different because here the disenfranchisement falls 
disproportionately on less educated, less literate voters. Because these voters are 
likely to be marginalized in some other areas of political and social life, courts 
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should find this burden to have a more troubling character. The character of the 
burden in the third scenario is still more problematic because of an additional layer: 
voters also have the experience of being turned away and treated as less than full, 
equal citizens. In these cases, courts ought to require a more pressing interest of the 
state to outweigh the interests of these citizens. 
The problematic character of the burdens in scenarios two and three can be 
restated in terms of groups: we might frame lack of education or illiteracy (or 
relative illiteracy) as the boundary of a group and find that those within the 
boundary are facing disproportionate burdens. A court could, but need not, pursue 
that analytic path. It is not necessary to draw a clear line demarcating the literate 
from the illiterate, estimate the relative disenfranchisement rates of those on either 
side of the line, or even decide whether this is a group that merits heightened 
statutory or constitutional protection in the first place, to see that the burden on the 
fundamental right to vote in these scenarios has a problematic character.325 The 
individual-rights-versus-state-interests framework allows courts to avoid some of 
the complex social-scientific questions that arise when plaintiffs are stand-ins either 
for groups or for the polity as a whole. Instead, this doctrinal framework allows 
courts to begin by doing something more familiar: focusing on the circumstances of 
the plaintiffs who are actually before the court and examining the character and 
magnitude of the burdens they face. 
CONCLUSION 
When we view election law claims through a structural lens, “the focus is not on 
the quantum of individualized harm involved.”326 Instead the focus is on either “the 
qualitative justifications for the state’s exercise of authority”327 or the legal 
regime’s effects on aggregate, structural variables.328 This shift in focus—the 
structural turn—has been the single most important development so far in the field 
of election law scholarship. Many problems in election law are not primarily about 
the interests of individual voters. The structural perspective has brought many of 
those important problems into sharp relief. But the structural lens has its limits. It 
blurs the stakes in a different, growing set of controversies in which, at least on one 
side, what is at stake is the individualized harm of being excluded from the circle of 
full and equal citizens. Parts I and II of this Article offered a framework for 
determining which controversies are which. By disaggregating the interests of 
individuals, groups, and the polity as a whole, we can specify when a structural 
approach clarifies and when it obscures. 
A stubborn gap remains, however, between the perspectives of election law 
scholars and the practices of courts. With rare exceptions,329 courts have not 
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explicitly followed structuralist scholars’ lead—even where structuralist reasoning 
is warranted. Instead they have applied the individual-rights-based tools of equal 
protection law, primarily the individual-rights-versus-state-interests doctrinal 
framework. On the remedial side, courts have been noticeably uncomfortable 
undertaking structural reforms.330 And yet a few elements of structuralism seem to 
be creeping in—often just where they are not needed. We have seen courts 
counting up how many individuals’ rights are burdened instead of determining the 
severity of the burdens; we have seen courts adopting questionable arguments 
recharacterizing structural problems such as fraud prevention as rights violations. 
The way forward here is to disentangle the new vote denial claims from other 
kinds of election law claims in which the interests on both sides are structural. 
Structuralist scholars’ longer-term problem—how to convince courts to view even 
the most structural questions through an explicitly structural lens—remains 
formidable. But the new vote denial claims are different. In these controversies, 
courts are uniquely equipped to do what is asked of them. Their role is to 
adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims, treating plaintiffs’ individual rights not as trumps but 
as distinct interests to be balanced carefully against the structural interests of the 
state. This balancing is not without its own difficulties, the most obvious of which 
stem from the incommensurability of the competing interests to be weighed. But 
this is the doctrine the Court has given us, and it has the real virtue of correctly 
identifying the main interests at stake on both sides. Courts and litigants now have 
an opportunity to develop this doctrine in a way that takes account of the equal 
citizenship dimension of the individual right to vote, building precedents that 
clarify which burdens ought to weigh more heavily against the state’s competing 
interests. Such a doctrine will enable courts to focus on individual claims that 
partisan legislators may not see. Courts can thereby act as an essential safety valve, 
protecting individuals from improper exclusion from the circle of full, equal 
citizens. 
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